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There is conflicting experimental evidence about whether the “stakes” or impor-
tance of being wrong affect judgments about whether a subject knows a proposition. 
To date, judgments about stakes effects on knowledge have been investigated using 
binary paradigms: responses to “low” stakes cases are compared with responses 
to “high” stakes cases. However, stakes or importance are not binary properties— 
they are scalar: whether a situation is “high” or “low” stakes is a matter of degree. 
So far, no experimental work has investigated the scalar nature of stakes effects on 
knowledge: do stakes effects increase as the stakes get higher? Do stakes effects only 
appear once a certain threshold of stakes has been crossed? Does the effect plateau 
at a certain point? To address these questions, we conducted experiments that probe 
for the scalarity of stakes effects using several experimental approaches. We found 
evidence of scalar stakes effects using an “evidence- seeking” experimental design, 
but no evidence of scalar effects using a traditional “evidence- fixed” experimen-
tal design. In addition, using the evidence- seeking design, we uncovered a large, 
but previously unnoticed framing effect on whether participants are skeptical about 
whether someone can know something, no matter how much evidence they have. 
The rate of skeptical responses and the rate at which participants were willing to 
attribute “lazy knowledge”— that someone can know something without having to 
check— were themselves subject to a stakes effect: participants were more skeptical 
when the stakes were higher, and more prone to attribute lazy knowledge when the 
stakes were lower. We argue that the novel skeptical stakes effect provides resources 
to respond to criticisms of the evidence- seeking approach that argue that it does not 
target knowledge.
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1. Background: Experimental Studies of Knowledge and Stakes
Is it easier to know something when very little is at stake in being right or wrong? 
If one believes that knowledge is sensitive to stakes, it might be the case that it is in-
deed easier to know trivial things. The view that knowledge is sensitive to stakes 
holds that whether a subject knows some proposition p depends on how much is 
at stake for that subject in being right or wrong about p; if knowledge is sensitive 
to stakes, it could be the case that the more that is at stake, the harder it is for the 
subject to know that p.
Advocates of the stakes- sensitivity of knowledge have assumed that their 
own intuitions that it is easier to know that something is the case in lower- stakes 
situations than in higher- stakes situations are representative of how ordinary 
people (that is, non- philosophers) would judge those cases. Experimental at-
tempts to verify that assumption have been mixed, however. While May et al. 
(2010) found evidence of an effect of stakes on knowledge, Buckwalter (2010) 
and Feltz and Zarpentine (2010) did not. Subsequent studies made the empiri-
cal case for the stakes- sensitivity of knowledge look more promising: Sripada 
and Stanley (2012), Pinillos (2012), and Pinillos and Simpson (2014) all found 
evidence that participants’ judgments of when an individual knew that p were 
sensitive to stakes. But a large cross- cultural study of judgments about cases in-
volving the stakes- sensitivity of knowledge found effects only for Spanish, Japa-
nese, and UK participants, and not for any of the other 16 sampled nationalities 
(Rose et al. 2019). Theoretical challenges to findings of stakes sensitivity have 
also been raised. Buckwalter (2014) and Buckwalter and Schaffer (2015) target 
what appear to be the strongest evidence in favor of the stakes- sensitivity of 
knowledge, namely Pinillos’s “evidence- seeking” studies (Pinillos 2012; Pinillos 
& Simpson 2014). These arguments make the case that the appearance of stakes 
effects on knowledge are actually stakes effects on other features that appear 
in the experimental prompts, so no conclusions about knowledge per se follow 
from the experimental data.1
In this paper, we aim to advance our understanding of the empirical founda-
tions of the stakes sensitivity of knowledge by looking at an aspect of the interac-
tion of stakes and knowledge that has not received any experimental attention, 
namely the scalar nature of stakes. To date, stakes effects on knowledge have 
been investigated using binary paradigms: responses to “low” stakes cases are 
compared with responses to “high” stakes cases. However, whether a situation 
is low or high stakes is not a binary property but a scalar property: whether a 
situation counts as “high” or “low” stakes comes in degrees and depends on 
1. See Gerken (2017: §2.5.b) for a longer summary of existing studies on practical effects on 
knowledge (stakes effects are one variety of practical effects— see §2 below for discussion).
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what it is being compared with (Anderson & Hawthorne 2019; Hansen 2014). 
No experimental work has investigated the scalar nature of stakes effects on 
knowledge: Do stakes effects increase as the stakes get higher? Do stakes effects 
only appear once a certain threshold of stakes has been crossed? Do stakes effect 
plateau at a certain point?
To address these questions, we conducted experiments that probe for the 
scalarity of stakes effects using several experimental approaches.2 In our first 
experiment, which adopts the classic “evidence- fixed” design employed in the 
earlier experimental studies of stakes effects on knowledge (e.g., Sripada & Stan-
ley 2012), we ask participants to rate their level of agreement with claims that S 
knows that P or S doesn’t know that P. To anticipate our results: Across several 
epistemic scenarios that vary the type of stakes, from personal injury to repu-
tation, we did not find any evidence of the stakes effects on judgments about 
knowledge, even when comparing relatively low and relatively high points on 
the scale of stakes. Since this failure to find an effect is at odds with the effect re-
ported in Sripada and Stanley (2012), we conducted a pre- registered replication 
of Sripada and Stanley’s study. Our replication did find a small effect of stakes 
on knowledge using the evidence- fixed design, but in a different condition than 
Sripada and Stanley’s study.
The second series of experiments we conducted employed the “evidence- 
seeking” approach developed in Pinillos (2012). We asked participants to judge 
how much evidence a subject needs to collect before she counts as knowing 
various propositions. Results from the evidence- seeking experimental design 
revealed stakes effects across multiple scenarios and indicate that there is vari-
ability in the structure of stakes effects when different scales of stakes are at issue 
(e.g., when number of lives or money or degrees of embarrassment are at stake).
In addition, by testing both positive and negative polarity versions of the 
evidence- seeking prompts in an attempt to identify a threshold for ascribing 
knowledge, we also were able to uncover a large framing effect on participants’ 
willingness to say that a subject in a scenario can never know that something is 
the case: Participants tended to respond to the negative prompt (“How many 
times can S check F and still not know that P?”) by saying that S can never know 
that P at much higher rates than in the equivalent positive prompt (“How many 
times does S need to check F before she knows that P?”). Finally, we found evi-
dence that the rate at which participants gave skeptical “never” responses in the 
negative frame and the rate at which participants gave “lazy knowledge” re-
sponses (S knows without having to check) in responses in the positive frame were 
themselves subject to a stakes effect in some of our evidence- seeking experiments. 
We argue that a stakes effect on skeptical “never” responses provides a new way 
2. The dataset from these experiments is available here: http://dx.doi.org/10.17864/1947.205.
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of responding to an important theoretical criticism of the evidence- seeking ap-
proach to uncovering a stakes effect on knowledge.
2. The Sensitivity of Knowledge to Stakes
Intellectualists about knowledge hold that “factors in virtue of which a true belief 
amounts to knowledge are exclusively truth- relevant, in the sense that they af-
fect how likely it is that the belief is true” (DeRose 2009: 24). Those who believe 
that knowledge is stakes- sensitive are a type of anti- intellectualist about knowl-
edge: anti- intellectualists “hold that whether a subject knows something or not 
depends in part on such non- truth- relevant ‘practical’ matters as the cost (to the 
subject) of being wrong” (DeRose 2009: 25; see also Gerken 2017: 34). Holding that 
knowledge is sensitive to stakes is only one way of being an anti- intellectualist. 
For example, one might hold that whether some subject knows something de-
pends partly on whether various possibilities are salient to the subject (Haw-
thorne 2003; see Dinges 2017 for discussion), or on how much time is available to 
the subject (Shin 2014). Our focus in this paper will be on stakes- sensitivity about 
knowledge, the view that whether a subject knows some proposition p depends 
on how much is at stake for that subject in being right or wrong about p.
Anderson and Hawthorne (2019) precisify the notion of stakes at work in 
theories of the stakes sensitivity of knowledge (usually characterized as the 
stakes of being wrong about some proposition p) in the following way:
A natural place to start is to articulate a measure of how much turns on 
p in performing a certain action A (where the core ideology focuses on a 
three- place relation between agents, actions, and propositions). Hence-
forth, we shall call this the ‘p- stakes of the action.’ . . . the p- stakes of an 
action is a matter of the gap between the utility of what would happen if 
one performed that action and p were the case, and what would happen 
if one performed that action and p were not the case.3
To illustrate the notion of the “p- stakes” of an action, consider the following 
action, proposition, and contrasting pair of scenarios:
3. Anderson and Hawthorne go on to problematize the notion of “stakes sensitivity”, but for 
our current purposes of evaluating the empirical evidence for theories that invoke the notion of 
stakes sensitivity, we will bracket their criticisms while exploiting their helpful precisified notion 
of stakes. See Armendt (2019) for additional dimensions (“odds” and “shape”) along which stakes 
can vary beyond their size.
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Action: Leaving the apartment without checking to see if I turned the stove off. 
p: The stove is turned off. 
Not- so- bad  scenario: I’m going out to check the mail, and I’ll come back in five 
minutes, when I can check to see if the stove is off. 
Bad scenario: I’m going out of town for a week and can’t check to see if the 
stove is off until I’m back (and I live alone).
Compare the gap between the utility of leaving the apartment without check-
ing to see if I turned the stove off given p versus given not p in the bad scenario 
versus the not- so- bad  scenario:
Bad scenario: if p is the case, my apartment does not explode because I left the 
gas on, while if p is not the case, it does.
Not- so- bad  scenario: if p is the case, my apartment does not explode because I left 
the gas on, while if p is not the case, it smells bad and I get a headache.
The greater differential in utility between outcomes in the bad scenario is what 
constitutes its “higher stakes” status. The stakes- sensitivity of knowledge can 
thus be understood as the claim that all else being equal, whether a subject is in 
the bad, high- stakes scenario or the not- so- bad, low- stakes scenario can make a 
difference to whether the subject knows that p.
3. What is a Scalar Stakes Effect on Knowledge?
Both the ordinary notion of “stakes” and the precisified notion given in the pre-
vious section are scalar, rather than binary, properties. That is, they admit of 
degrees of application beyond 0 and 1, and those degrees can be compared using 
expressions like “x is a higher- stakes scenario than y”. It is possible to arrange 
scenarios in terms of increasing stakes. For example, the “bad” scenario dis-
cussed above is nowhere near as bad as things could get. For example, suppose 
that while I’m on vacation, I leave my cat at home with an automatic feeder. The 
utility of not checking to see if the gas is still on, given not- p, is that she’s blown 
to smithereens along with my apartment. The stakes in that scenario are there-
fore even higher than the “bad” scenario. One can imagine how things could be 
even worse (imagine if I had two cats)— and thereby also how the stakes could 
be even higher. There is no obvious upper bound to the stakes scale— for any 
Ergo • vol. 6, no. 16 • 2019
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given “high stakes” scenario, there will be a scenario that will have even higher 
stakes. There is therefore no absolute notion of “high” stakes: whether stakes are 
high is a relative notion (Kennedy & McNally 2005).
Given that the notion of stakes is scalar, are stakes effects on knowledge (if 
there are any) also scalar? As stakes go up, how are judgments about knowl-
edge affected? Do people attribute knowledge less and less as the stakes go up, 
or is there a “plateau” beyond which further increases in stakes stop affecting 
judgments about knowledge? How large do the differences in stakes have to be 
before one of the scenarios counts as “high” vs. “low” stakes?
In order to answer these questions, we designed experiments that created a 
variety of stakes scales, along which the stakes of being wrong about a particular 
proposition varied. To return to the example concerning whether the stove was 
left on, discussed in the previous section, instead of just a “bad” (high) and a 
“not- so- bad” (low) scenario, it could be supplemented with more scenarios that 
fill out the relevant stakes scale, as follows:
Action: Leaving the apartment without checking to see if I turned the stove off. 
p: The stove is turned off. 
Stakes 1, Not- so- bad  scenario: I’m going out to check the mail, and I’ll come back 
in five minutes, when I can check to see if the stove is off. 
Stakes 2, Bad scenario: I’m going out of town for a week and can’t check to see 
if the stove is off until I’m back (and I live alone). 
Stakes 3, Very bad scenario: I’m going out of town for a week and can’t check to 
see if the stove is off until I’m back, and I live with a cat. 
Stakes 4, Terrible scenario: I’m going out of town for a week and can’t check to 
see if the stove is off until I’m back, and I live with a cat, a gray parrot, and I 
have several unpublished papers by J. L. Austin in my library, one of which 
contains a heretofore unknown and totally convincing response to external 
world skepticism.
One possibility that becomes clear when the stakes scale is expanded beyond two 
degrees is that the difference in stakes between any two adjacent points on the 
scale (between “not- so- bad” and “bad”, for example) might not be big enough 
to trigger a stakes effect on knowledge. Previous experiments which failed to 
uncover a stakes effect, all of which only use two points on a stakes scale, might 
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simply have failed to pick points on the stakes scale that were distinct enough 
for a stakes effect to show up.
In order to examine the scalarity of stakes effects on judgments about knowl-
edge, we designed two experiments. The first experiment used “evidence- fixed” 
prompts: participants were asked, across four different points on the relevant 
stakes scale for six different scenarios (concerning paramedics racing to the 
scene of an accident, scientists checking the formula for a vaccine, mountaineers 
checking their climbing rope, participants on a game show thinking about an 
answer to a question, a moderator for a talk looking up the pronunciation of a 
guest speaker’s name before introducing them, and a homeowner checking on 
her home sprinkler system in response to the threat of an arsonist), to agree or 
disagree with sentences attributing knowledge and denying knowledge to the 
protagonist of each scenario. In each scenario, the amount of evidence avail-
able to the protagonist remained fixed, while the point on the stakes scale was 
varied. The first experiment is discussed in Section 4. We also conducted a pre- 
registered replication of Sripada and Stanley’s (2012) “evidence- fixed” study, 
which will be discussed in relation to our first experiment, and the details of 
which are presented in Appendix II.
The second experiment used the “evidence- seeking” prompts introduced in 
Pinillos (2012). Instead of asking participants to agree or disagree with state-
ments that the protagonist knows or doesn’t know a proposition, participants 
were asked to indicate how much evidence the protagonist would have to gather 
in order to know that the relevant proposition is true (in the positive polarity 
condition), or how much evidence the protagonist could gather and still not 
know the relevant proposition (in the negative polarity condition). The scenarios 
and points on the relevant stakes scales were the same as in the “evidence- fixed” 
experiment. The second experiment is discussed in Section 5.
4. Experiment 1: The “Evidence- Fixed” Design
4.1. Experimental Materials
Six scenarios were developed in which different types of stakes were manipu-
lated (lives; physical injury; embarrassment; money; damage to objects of per-
sonal value). Four versions of each scenario were created in which the stakes 
were scaled in magnitude (see Supplementary Material for all scenarios and 
versions). For example, the ‘vaccine’ scenario involves changing the number of 
lives at stake should a vaccine be made incorrectly and administered to research 
participants:
434 • Kathryn Francis, Philip Beaman, and Nat Hansen
Ergo • vol. 6, no. 16 • 2019
Stakes 1: Low
Elaine is a medical researcher. Her task is to create a vaccine for a virus. 
Elaine has done this before, and she has a check list that specifies all of 
the steps she needs to take to make the vaccine. Elaine is following all of 
the steps correctly.
Elaine’s assistant has informed her that there is one human research 
participant who has volunteered to trial the vaccine before it is distribut-
ed more widely. If Elaine does not follow the steps correctly, it will pro-
duce an ineffective combination that when administered to the research 
participant will give them mild cold- like symptoms. 
In the above ‘low’ stakes version of the scenario, one individual will experience 
mild symptoms. These stakes are then incrementally raised in the remaining ver-
sions of the scenario:
Stakes 2
. . . one human research participant who has volunteered to trial the 
vaccine before it is distributed more widely. If Elaine does not follow the 
steps correctly, it will produce an ineffective combination that when ad-
ministered to the research participant will kill him within days. 
Stakes 3
. . . 15 human research participants who have volunteered to trial the 
vaccine before it is distributed more widely. If Elaine does not follow 
the steps correctly, it will produce an ineffective combination that when 
administered to the research participants will kill them all within days. 
Stakes 4: High
. . . 100 human research participants who have volunteered to trial the 
vaccine before it is distributed more widely. If Elaine does not follow 
the steps correctly, it will produce an ineffective combination that when 
administered to the research participants will kill them all after several 
days of excruciating pain. 
After reading each scenario, participants were asked to respond to a knowledge 
prompt along a 7- point Likert- type scale (the endpoints of the Likert scale were 
labeled as follows: 1- Strongly disagree, 7- Strongly agree). Whether participants re-
ceived a negative or positive knowledge prompt was determined by initial con-
dition assignment (positive polarity condition; negative polarity condition). For 
example, having read the vaccine scenario (above) participants in the positive 
polarity condition were asked to rate their level of agreement with the statement:
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Elaine knows that she is making the vaccine correctly
Participants in the negative polarity condition were asked to rate their level of 
agreement with the statement:
Elaine doesn’t know that she is making the vaccine correctly
To exclude any participants who failed to understand the experimental instruc-
tions, all participants had to respond correctly to a control question at the be-
ginning of the experiment (Prompt 1) and a control question at the end of the 
experiment (Prompt 2) in order to be included in the data analysis. Participants 
who responded “agree” or “strongly agree” to Prompt 1 were removed and par-
ticipants who responded “disagree” or “strongly disagree” to Prompt 2 were 
removed.4
Prompt 1
You have a fair coin, with heads on one side and tails on the other, that you flip into the 
air and catch on the back of your hand without looking at it.
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement 
about the scenario:
You know the coin landed heads
1 (strongly disagree) – 7 (strongly agree)
Prompt 2
You have a fair coin, with heads on one side and tails on the other, that you flip into the 
air and catch on the back of your hand without looking at it.
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following description of 
the scenario:
You don’t know that the coin landed heads
1 (strongly agree) – 7 (strongly disagree)5
4. The controls were simplified versions of the coin flipping scenario used in Horvath and 
Wiegman (2016), Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg (2008), and Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001).
5. This is the only reversed Likert scale of all experiments reported in this paper.
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4.2. Procedure
Participants in both the positive and negative polarity conditions were presented 
with six scenarios in four different degrees of stakes each (24 pairs of scenario + 
degree of stakes) in a randomized block design. Using this design ensures that 
all scenarios occur once in a sequence (or block) before any of them is repeated.
4.3. Participants
One hundred and twenty participants were recruited from MTurk and paid 
$1.75 each for participating. This research received ethical approval from the De-
partment of Philosophy, University of Reading, UK and informed consent was 
obtained from all participants. Procedures were performed ex post to identify 
suspicious or low- quality responses in all datasets.6 Following screening proce-
dures, eight responses were flagged as Virtual Private Server (VPS) responses 
and subsequently removed. As an additional screening procedure, participants 
who responded incorrectly to one of the above control prompts were removed 
from further data analysis. A total of 15 participants were removed having failed 
one or more of these checks, leaving a final sample of 97 participants (44 females, 
52 males, 1 non- binary gender identity) between 20 and 71 years old (M = 39.64 
years, SD = 12.00 years). Participants were randomly assigned to the positive po-
larity condition (N = 55) or the negative polarity condition (N = 42).
4.4. Hypothesis
If knowledge is sensitive to stakes, we should observe differences in levels of 
agreement with the knowledge prompts in at least some of the different degrees 
of stakes of a particular scenario. For example, we should find some difference 
between the “low stakes” and the “high stakes” versions of at least one of the six 
scenarios we tested, in either the positive or negative polarity. Independent of 
the stakes sensitivity of knowledge, there should also be an effect of switching 
the polarity of the prompt: If participants are willing to agree with the statement 
that the protagonist of a story knows that p in a particular scenario with a particu-
lar degree of stakes, participants should be less willing to agree with the state-
6. Given recent concerns and emerging evidence that the integrity of MTurk- based studies 
has been compromised by bots or responses from individuals using Virtual Private Servers (VPS) 
(faking their location), screening procedures were performed by identifying identical GPS loca-
tions with unique IP addresses, determining whether IP addresses derived from an Internet Ser-
vice Provider (ISP) or data center, and evaluating open- ended responses against a set of criteria 
(for full details regarding this procedure see Dennis, Goodson, & Pearson 2018).
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ment that the protagonist doesn’t know that p in the same combination of scenario 
and degree of stakes.
4.5. Results
Overall and contrary to our hypothesis, there were consistent levels of agree-
ment and disagreement across all stakes versions of all scenarios (see Figure 1). 
There was no main effect of stakes in any of the scenarios, meaning that we did 
not detect any influence of what or how much was at stake on levels of agree-
ment with knowledge prompts (positive or negative). Our hypothesis regarding 
polarity was supported; across all scenarios, participants were more willing to 
agree that the protagonist knows that p and less willing to agree that the pro-
tagonist doesn’t know that p (for a full summary of individual statistics for each 
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Figure 1. Levels of agreement and disagreement with knowledge prompts across 
all degrees of stakes for all six scenarios. Levels of agreement and disagreement 
are consistent across all stakes scales (note the lines are level with little slope). 
Levels of agreement are significantly higher for positive polarity prompts than 
for negative polarity prompts. Error bars represent +/- 1 Standard Error (SE).
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4.6. Discussion
Using the evidence- fixed approach, we found no evidence of a stakes effect on 
judgments about knowledge. This finding was consistent across all six of our 
scenarios when varying what was at stake— whether what was at stake was peo-
ple’s lives, money, objects of personal value, or the degree of the protagonist’s 
embarrassment.
While these findings are in accordance with several previous evidence- fixed 
studies which failed to find an effect, they conflict with findings from Sripada 
and Stanley (2012), who did find evidence of a stakes effect on judgments about 
knowledge using an evidence- fixed design. Given the conflicting findings, we 
carried out a pre- registered replication of Sripada and Stanley’s (2012) experi-






























































Figure 2: Strength of evidence across the three vignette pairs (left hand panel) 
and Levels of agreement and disagreement with the knowledge claim across the 
three vignette pairs. (right hand panel). Error bars represent +/- 1SE. * = small effect 
size. ** = medium effect size (Cohen’s d). In the strength of evidence comparison 
(left panel) there was a medium effect of stakes in the basic vignette pair, (t(124) = 
3.17, p =.002, d = 0.57) with strength of evidence higher in the low stakes scenario. 
The effect of stakes was not significant in the other vignettes [Implicit/Explicit: 
t(117) = 0.54, p = .588; Ignorant: t(120) = 0.84, p =.511]. For the levels of agreement 
comparison (right panel) there was a smaller effect of stakes in the basic vignette 
pair, (t(124) = - .2.57, p =.011, d = 0.46) with levels of agreement are higher in the 
low stakes scenario. Once again there was no significant effect of stakes in the 
other vignettes [Implicit/Explicit: t(117) = - 1.48, p = .142; Ignorant: t(120) = - 0.98, 
p =.329].
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Using Sripada and Stanley’s between- groups experimental design, groups 
of participants were presented with one of six scenarios (N = 58 – 68 per group). 
Investigating three pairs of vignettes with a low and high stakes version, we 
asked all participants to respond to a question about the protagonist’s strength 
of evidence (what is the strength of S’s evidence that P), followed by a judgment 
about the protagonist’s knowledge (level of agreement/disagreement with: S 
knows that P). In the “basic” vignettes, we replicated Sripada and Stanley’s find-
ing of an effect of stakes on quality of evidence: we found a medium- sized effect 
of stakes, with participants stating that the protagonist’s evidence was weaker in 
the high stakes case (see the left- hand side of Figure 2). But we did not replicate 
their finding of a stakes effect on quality of evidence in the “implicit/explicit” or 
“ignorant” vignette pairs. In judgments about knowledge, we found a small ef-
fect of stakes with participants being less inclined to agree with the knowledge 
claim in the “basic” vignette pair (see the right- hand side of Figure 2). We did 
not find evidence of a stakes effect on judgments about evidence or knowledge 
in the “implicit/explicit” or “ignorant” vignette pairs; these controlled for stakes 
being implicitly versus explicitly described (implicit low/explicit high) and the 
protagonist being ignorant of the stakes involved (ignorant low/ignorant high) 
(see Implicit/Explicit and Ignorant bars in figures). This is the opposite pattern of 
stakes effects that Sripada and Stanley found; they found effects in the “implicit/
explicit” and “ignorant” vignette pairs, but not in the “basic” vignette pairs.
The results of our evidence- fixed experiment alongside the findings from 
our replication of Sripada and Stanley (2012) indicate that while the “evidence- 
fixed” experimental design is capable of uncovering stakes effects on judgments 
about knowledge, those effects are hard to find and, if found, are small. One 
additional worry about the effects found in the original Sripada and Stanley 
(2012) study— as well as our replication— is that the question asking participants 
whether they agree with the knowledge claim always follows the quality of evi-
dence question— the order of those questions is not varied. This ordering could 
potentially be influencing how participants are responding to each prompt and 
contributing to the observed effect.7 In our larger, more diverse “evidence- fixed” 
experiment, we did not ask participants about the quality of the evidence avail-
able to the protagonist before asking them whether they agreed with a claim 
about knowledge. That difference could account for the divergent finding in the 
different evidence- fixed experiments we conducted. We return to this possibility 
in our General Discussion (§6).
Although the results of the “evidence- fixed” design have provided only 
mixed results, the “evidence- seeking” design used in Pinillos (2012) and Pinillos 
and Simpson (2014) has consistently found evidence of stakes effects. For that 
7. This possibility is noted by Gerken (2017: 267 n. 8).
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reason, we therefore conducted an “evidence- seeking” version of our experi-
ment to further probe for the scalarity of stakes effects.
5. Experiment 2: The “Evidence- Seeking” Design
5.1. Materials and Procedure
The same set of scenarios were presented to participants in the same randomized 
block design as in Experiment 1. As before, one group of participants received 
positive prompts and the other received negative prompts.
In this experiment, the original knowledge prompts from Experiment 1 were 
replaced with evidence- seeking prompts. For example, in response to the vac-
cine scenario, participants in the positive polarity condition were asked:
How many times does Elaine need to consult her check list before she 
knows that she is making the vaccine correctly?
____ times
and participants in the negative polarity were asked:
How many times can Elaine consult her check list and still not know that 
she is making the vaccine correctly?
____ times
As in Pinillos and Simpson (2014), after reading the positive polarity prompt, 
participants were asked to respond as follows:
enter a whole number: 1, 2, 3 . . . etc. If you think Elaine knows without 
having to check, write “0”. If you think Elaine will never know no matter 
how many times she checks, write “never”
Participants were asked to respond as follows in the negative polarity condition:
enter a whole number: 1, 2, 3 . . . etc. If you think Elaine will never know 
no matter how many times she checks, write “never”8
8. We did not include the option to write “0” if you think S knows without having to check in the 
negative polarity condition because the response sounded odd in response to the negative prompt.
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5.2. Participants
One hundred and twenty participants were recruited from MTurk and paid 
$1.75 each for participating. This research received ethical approval from the De-
partment of Philosophy, University of Reading, UK and informed consent was 
obtained from all participants. As before, screening procedures were performed 
ex post to identify suspicious or low- quality responses in all datasets. Following 
screening procedures, three suspicious responses were flagged and removed. 
Additionally, participants who responded incorrectly to one of two control 
prompts (these were the same coin control prompts used in Experiment 1) were 
removed from further data analysis. A total of 8 participants were removed hav-
ing failed these checks leaving a final sample of 109 participants (54 females, 55 
males) between 21 and 74 years old (M = 38.98 years, SD = 11.76 years). Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to a positive polarity condition (N = 58) or a nega-
tive polarity condition (N = 51).
5.3. Hypothesis
If knowledge is sensitive to stakes, we expect to find some effect of changing 
stakes on responses to a given polarity in a given scenario. For example, we 
should find some significant difference in responses to the “low” and “high” 
stakes conditions for positive or negative polarity prompts in at least one of the 
six scenarios we considered.
Regarding the effect of polarity, we do not expect to find a significant differ-
ence between responses to the negative and positive polarity prompts. That’s 
because participants should be searching for the threshold of how much evi-
dence is required for knowledge when presented with either the positive or the 
negative prompts. To explain why, consider a particular example of a positive 
prompt in the “high” stakes version of the vaccine scenario:
Positive: How many times does Elaine need to consult her check list before she 
knows that she is making the vaccine correctly?
If participants respond to the positive prompt with 3 times, they should give a 
similar number in response to the negative prompt in the same combination of 
scenario and degree of stakes:
Negative: How many times can Elaine consult her check list and still not know 
that she is making the vaccine correctly?
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It would be unexpected to find that participants would say that Elaine could 
consult her check list a significantly different number of times and still not know 
that she’s making the vaccine correctly while saying that she needs to consult her 
check list only 3 times before she knows that she’s making the vaccine correctly.9
9. More precisely, we expect that responses to the negative polarity prompts should have val-
ues one lower than responses to the positive polarity prompts. If S needs to check N times before 
she knows that P, then the maximum number she can check and still not know that P would be 
N- 1. But we expected that we wouldn’t be able to detect this difference, even if it does exist. Thanks 
to an anonymous referee for asking about this.
 


























































































Stakes 2 Stakes 3 Stakes 4:
High
Possessions
Figure 3. The amount of evidence participants state is needed in order for the 
protagonist to know/or that can be had while the protagonist still doesn’t know 
across all stakes versions of all six scenarios. Amount of evidence required 
increased as the stakes were raised in each scenario (note positive gradient 
of lines). In the possessions scenario, this effect was observed in the positive 
polarity only. Error bars represent +/- 1SE.
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5.4. Results
Overall and in line with our hypothesis, there were effects of changing stakes on 
responses across both the negative and positive polarities in all scenarios (in the 
possessions scenario, this change in responses was observed in the positive po-
larity only) (see Figure 3).10 Across scenarios, as the stakes increased, there was 
a general pattern of participants stating that more evidence would be needed. In 
terms of the scalarity of these stakes effects, there was a clear pattern of lower 
stakes scenarios requiring less evidence than higher stakes scenarios (for a full 
summary of scenario and stakes scales analyses, see Appendix III). We did not 
observe any significant difference in responses to positive and negative polarity 
prompts (for a full summary of individual statistics for each scenario, see Ap-
pendix III).
In the evidence- seeking task, we also collected two additional types of re-
sponse from participants:
10. The data summarised here follows outlier removal. For details regarding how outliers 

























“Know” = positive polarity prompt; 
“Don’t Know” = negative polarity prompt 
Figure 4. The percentage of “never” responses (left) and zero responses (right) 
given in response to positive and negative prompts (across all scenarios). The 
proportion of “never” responses was significantly higher in the negative polarity 
(χ²(1) = 188.52, p < .001). The proportion of “0” responses was significantly higher 
in the positive polarity (χ²(1) = 28.51, p < .001). Error bars represent +/- 1SEp 
(converted to %).
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enter a whole number: 1, 2, 3 . . . etc. If you think Elaine knows without 
having to check, write “0” (in the positive polarity condition). If you think 
Elaine will never know no matter how many times she checks, write 
“never” (in both the positive and negative polarity conditions)
Previous papers simply discarded these “never” responses from further analysis 
(Pinillos & Simpson 2014: 21) and in terms of zero responses, our analyses did 
not include values less than or equal to 0.11
Upon closer inspection, we noticed something unexpected about these re-
sponses: There was a much larger number of “never” answers given in response 
to the negative polarity prompt concerning how much evidence a protagonist 
could have and still not know that p than in response to the positive polarity 
prompt. “Never” answers made up 22% of the overall responses in the nega-
tive polarity group but only 2% of responses in the positive polarity group (see 
11. When the distribution of the dependent variable (in this case, amount of evidence required) 




















Stakes 2 Stakes 3 Stakes 4:
High
“Never” “0” 
Know Don’t Know 
Figure 5. The percentage of “never” responses (left- hand side) and zero 
responses (right- hand side) given in each stakes scale (across all scenarios) in 
each polarity condition. The frequency of “never” answers given in response to 
negative prompts increased as the stakes were raised (note positive gradient of 
line) although this was not significant in inferential analyses. The frequency of 
zero answers given in response to positive prompts significantly decreased as 
the stakes were raised (note negative gradient of line). Error bars represent +/- 
1SEp (converted to %).
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Figure 4). In effect, many more participants were responding to the prompt 
“skeptically”— that is, responding that they thought that no matter how many 
times she checks, S will never know that p.12 We also observed a larger percentage of 
“0” responses to the positive (8.5%) than in the negative prompts (4%), but that 
isn’t surprising given that participants weren’t explicitly given the option to re-
spond with “0” if the subject knows without having to check in the negative polarity 
prompts (see Figure 4). The meaning of a “0” response when given in response 
to a positive vs. a negative polarity prompt is therefore probably different: in 
response to a positive prompt such a response means S knows without having 
to check; in response to a negative prompt, it’s not clear what a “0” response 
means.
Once we noticed these large disparities in “never” and “0” responses be-
tween the positive and negative polarity prompts, we wondered whether there 
might be a stakes effect on the rate at which participants gave these responses. If 
knowledge is sensitive to stakes, it’s possible that the number of these declara-
tions (S will never know no matter how many times she checks and S knows without 
having to check) will vary when the stakes vary.
In order to investigate this, we analysed the frequency of “never” and “0” 
responses in each stakes scale across all scenarios. We found no main effect of 
stakes in global analysis across all stakes scales for “never” responses (see left- 
hand side Figure 5).13 But we did find an overall pattern of participants being less 
likely to say that S knows P without having to check (“0”) as the stakes increased in 
the positive polarity (see right- hand side Figure 5).14
5.5. Discussion
Using the evidence- seeking approach, we found evidence of a stakes effect: As 
the stakes were raised, individuals stated that the protagonist would need to 
gather more evidence in order to know something or that she could gather more 
evidence and still not know something. This finding was consistent across the 
12. Pinillos and Simpson (2014: 40 n. 18) suggest that “never” responses “may indeed reveal 
a skeptical attitude toward the possibility of knowledge”.
13. Analysis GEE, poisson [loglinear]) model (count data) revealed a main effect of polarity, 
(Wald X2[1] = 34.33, p <.001). There was no main effect of stakes, (p =.522). The interaction of polar-
ity x stakes was not significant, (Wald X2[3] = 7.28, p =.064).
14. Analysis (GEE, poisson [loglinear]) revealed a main effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 11.02, 
p =.012) and a significant interaction of polarity x stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 8.65, p =.034). There was no 
main effect of polarity, (p =.168). When interpreting the interaction, comparisons using sequential 
Bonferroni indicated a significant difference between the zero counts in the stakes 1 [low] scenarios 
and the stakes 3 scenarios (p =.031) and between the stakes 1 [low] scenarios and the stakes 4 [high] 
scenarios (p =.031) with a lower number in the higher stakes scenarios. This effect was present for 
the positive polarity only.
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majority of our scenarios (bar the scenario involving personal possessions in 
which a stakes effect was found for the positive polarity only). We further found 
evidence that these stakes effects were scalar, not binary. In the majority of sce-
narios, participants stated that less evidence would be required by the protago-
nist in stakes 1 [low] cases when compared to the stakes 4 [high] cases. However, 
the details of how degrees on the scale of stakes affected knowledge judgments 
varied across different scenarios. For both the paramedic and vaccine scenarios 
(the vignettes in which lives were at stake), the stakes 1 [low] case was significant-
ly different to the stakes 3 case with the amount of evidence plateauing after this 
point. That could be due to participants reaching a saturation point of how much 
the number of lives at stake affect knowledge. In the mountaineering scenario, 
the stakes 1 [low] case was significantly different to all of the subsequent stakes 
cases (i.e., stakes 2, stakes 3, and stakes 4 [high]). In the possessions scenario, the 
reverse pattern was found with the stakes 4 [high] case being significantly differ-
ent to all previous stakes cases (i.e., stakes 1 [low], stakes 2, and stakes 3). Finally, 
in the game show scenario, the stakes 1 [low] case was significantly different to 
the stakes 3 and stakes 4 [high] cases. But the stakes 2 case was also significantly 
different to the stakes 4 [high] case.
The variability we observed in scalar stakes effects across the different sce-
narios is unsurprising, given that (i) the scenarios differed in their details, in-
cluding what the scale of stakes was measuring (lives, money, embarrassment, 
non- monetary possessions, personal injury), and (ii) we relied on our own in-
tuitive, non- systematic sense of what would make for noticeable differences be-
tween different degrees of stakes on each scale. Future investigations of scalar 
stakes effects could systematically construct particular types of stakes scales in 
order to evaluate more precisely how the shape of particular stakes scales af-
fect knowledge judgments. For example, according to Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1979) prospect theory, people experience monetary losses and gains with di-
minishing sensitivity: moving from $5 to $10 is experienced as a bigger gain than 
going from $95 to $100. And people are “loss- averse”— losing $5 hurts more than 
gaining $5 feels good. With these factors in mind, it would be possible to more 
systematically construct monetary stakes scales with the aim of making the dif-
ferences between degrees on those scales more regular. That would also serve to 
bring the discussion of stakes understood as differences in expected utility (as on 
the Anderson and Hawthorne proposal discussed in §2) into contact with what 
we know about human decision making under risk and uncertainty. That is a 
potentially rich area for future experimental work on stakes effects.
With regards to the “never” responses, we found a large framing effect in 
the different polarities: people were more likely to respond with “never” (S can 
never know that P) when presented with a negative prompt. That result is sur-
prising. We predicted that there should be no significant difference in numer-
 Stakes, Scales, and Skepticism • 447
ical responses to the positive and negative polarity prompts, so we assumed 
that there should be no significant difference between the “never” responses to 
the positive and negative polarity prompts as well. What could be driving this 
framing effect? One possibility is that participants are being encouraged by the 
negative prompt to consider possible situations in which someone could fail to 
know that P in spite of having a great deal of evidence that P is the case. When 
that possibility is suggested, it might appear reasonable to respond that S will 
never know, no matter how much evidence she has, because she can’t rule out 
the possibility that she is in such a situation. When confronted with the positive 
polarity prompt, in contrast, participants are not being encouraged to consider 
such a situation.15
The fact that we found a stakes effect on “0” responses in the positive polar-
ity group is a previously unnoticed stakes effect: people are less likely to say that 
S knows P without having to check as the stakes increase. Although we did not find 
a significant stakes effect on the “never” responses, there was a pattern of people 
stating that S can never know that P in greater numbers as the stakes were raised. 
As we will discuss below, in a follow- up experiment we did observe a stakes ef-
fect on “never” responses.
In order to illuminate these unexpected findings, we ran two follow- up stud-
ies that addressed two worries that we had with the existing experimental de-
sign:
 1. The existing negative prompt included the phrase (in bold): “how many 
times can S check and still not know that P” which may have triggered the 
presupposition that the protagonist does not know that P, which might 
have contributed to the framing effect on “never” and “0” responses.
 2. The option to “write ‘0’ if you think S knows without having to check” was 
only included after positive prompts (not negative prompts) which may 
have contributed to the framing effect on “never” responses by giving the 
positive polarity group a different response anchor.
To address our first concern, we ran a follow- up experiment (Symmetrical 
Experiment) which replicated the existing paradigm but with symmetrical nega-
15. When you ask someone how many times one can check something and still not know 
it, it’s reasonable to consider the fact that one can check as often as one likes and still not know 
it if, for example, one is checking carelessly. That is one way of understanding how the negative 
prompt encourages a greater frequency of “never” responses, by making salient the ever- present 
possibility of error. In contrast, when you ask someone how often one needs to check something 
before one knows it, it’s reasonable to consider the fact that one might not need to check at all 
because there are other ways of knowing it besides checking. That could explain why the positive 
prompt encourages a greater frequency of “0” responses. Thanks to Alexander Dinges for discus-





























“Know” = positive polarity prompt; 
“Don’t Know” = negative polarity prompt 
 
Figure 6. The percentage of “never” answers in the Symmetrical Experiment (left- 
hand side) and the Matched Experiment (right- hand side) given in response to 
positive and negative prompts (across all scenarios). The proportion of “never” 
responses was significantly higher in the negative polarity in the Symmetrical 
Experiment (χ²(1) = 115.32, p < .001) and in the Matched Experiment (χ²(1) = 




















Figure 7. The percentage of “never” responses given in each stakes scale (across 
all scenarios) in each polarity condition of the Symmetrical Experiment. The 
frequency of “never” answers given in response to prompts increased as the 
stakes were raised from stakes 1 [low] to stakes 3.
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tive and positive prompts, removing the phrase “still not know” (see Appendix 
IV for full experimental details). And to address our second concern, we ran 
another follow- up experiment (Matched Experiment) which replicated the design 
of the Symmetrical Experiment but simply removed the option to “write ‘0’ if 
you think S knows without having to check” from the positive polarity prompts (see 
Appendix IV for full experimental details).
The framing effect on “never” responses was preserved across both experi-
ments when controlling for the wording of the prompt and when removing the 
additional prompt option in the positive polarity (see Figure 6).
In the second, Symmetrical, experiment, we found a stakes effect on “never” 
responses (see figure 7).16 (For full analyses, see Appendix IV.)
The finding of a stakes effect on “never” responses is important because it 
offers a response to a powerful theoretical objection that has been made to the 
use of evidence- seeking experiments as a way of investigating stakes effects 
on knowledge. Buckwalter and Schaffer (2015: 214) argue that the reason that 
changing stakes affect judgments about evidence- seeking prompts is that the 
evidence- seeking prompts contain a deontic modal (“need”, or “has” in Pinil-
los 2012), and it is uncontroversial that what is at stake affects judgments about 
what someone needs to do; it is the effect of changing stakes on the deontic 
modal that is driving participants’ responses, rather than any effect of stakes on 
knowledge. However, when participants respond with “never”, they are respond-
ing to a secondary prompt that does not contain a deontic modal, namely:
If you think Elaine will never know no matter how many times she checks, write 
“never”.
Since we found evidence that the rate at which participants respond with “nev-
er” is itself sensitive to stakes, that looks like evidence of a genuine stakes effect 
on participants’ judgments about whether someone can ever know that p which 
cannot be explained as an effect of stakes interacting with an interpretation of a 
deontic modal.17
We offer this as a tentative response only, because we only found a stakes 
16. In order to investigate stakes effects on these responses, a GEE analysis with poisson 
(loglinear) model was performed on the frequency of “never” responses in the follow- up experi-
ment using symmetrical prompts. Analysis revealed a main effect of polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 20.82, p 
<.001), a main effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 14.65, p =.002), and a significant interaction of polarity 
x stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 7.88, p =.049) (see Figure 7).
17. A referee asks whether “never” responses could be consistent with the Buckwalter and 
Schaffer view, if such responses were understood as meaning that the subject should never perform 
the relevant action (checking the rope to see if it’s secured in the climbing scenario, e.g.). We can’t 
rule out this interpretation, but we find it implausible that participants who respond with “never” 
would say that the subject should never perform the relevant action.
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effect on skeptical “never” responses in one out of three of the evidence- seeking 
experiments we conducted. In the third and final Matched Experiment that we 
ran, as in the first experiment, we did not find a stakes effect on skeptical “never” 
responses. (See Appendix IV for detailed analyses.) The mixed findings across 
our three evidence- seeking experiments regarding the stakes effect on skeptical 
“never” responses might arise from the fact that the effect is small— this is some-
thing that will have to be addressed in future research designed specifically to 
investigate stakes effects on skeptical judgments.
A referee pointed out that our finding of a stakes effect on both positive and 
negative knowledge prompts (“S doesn’t know that P”) also presents a challenge 
to Buckwalter and Schaffer’s objection to the results of evidence- seeking experi-
ments. The negative prompt, “How many times can S [check] and not know that 
P?” contains a modal expression (“can”), but it’s not a deontic modal— it’s either 
an ability modal or a modal expressing metaphysical possibility. While stakes 
clearly affect what one should do (for example, in how we interpret the deontic 
modal “have” in the positive prompt), stakes don’t obviously affect what one 
is able to do, or what is possible in a metaphysical sense. The stakes effect we 
found on responses to the negative prompts therefore isn’t easily explained in 
the same way that Buckwalter and Schaffer explain the stakes effect on positive 
prompts in evidence- seeking experiments.
A stakes effect on “0” responses was found in the Symmetrical Experiment 
(see analyses in Appendix IV) although this time, the effect was seen across both 
prompts. So, participants were more likely to respond with “0” in lower stakes 
scenarios when presented with both positive and negative prompts.
As well as allowing us to investigate the “never” responses further, these 
follow- up experiments also served as opportunities to replicate the stakes effects 
found in the first evidence- seeking experiment. Overall, we found that the stakes 
effects observed in our first evidence- seeking experiment replicated across one 
or both of the follow- up experiments (for a full summary of individual scenar-
io analyses see Appendix IV), with the paramedic scenario (number of lives at 
stake) and the game show scenario (amount of money at stake) consistently pro-
ducing stakes effects across all three of the evidence- seeking experiments.
6. General Discussion and Conclusions
6.1. Evidence- Fixed versus Evidence- Seeking Results
Using the classic evidence- fixed design employed in earlier experimental stud-
ies of stakes effects on knowledge, we did not find evidence of a stakes effect on 
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judgments about knowledge across several epistemic scenarios.18 However, in a 
second series of experiments which employ the evidence- seeking approach de-
veloped in Pinillos (2012), we did find evidence of a stakes effect across multiple 
scenarios.
Based on our findings and the results of previous studies, there are two types 
of competing explanations for this pattern of negative and positive results in the 
two types of experiment. The first type of explanation, which is favorable to the 
existence of genuine stakes effects on knowledge, is that there is some feature of 
the evidence- fixed design that obscures such a stakes effect. Pinillos (2012: 198) 
and Sripada and Stanley (2012: 10) hypothesize that stakes effects on knowledge 
exist, but they can be difficult to observe in evidence- fixed experimental designs 
because participants assume that protagonists in higher stakes situations will 
have gathered more evidence than those in lower stakes scenarios, leading to a 
tendency to judge that subjects know that P at greater rates in higher stakes situ-
ations, which would suppress any effect of higher stakes lowering the tendency 
to judge that subjects know that P. The possibility that participants may be re-
vising their sense of how much evidence the protagonist has upwards in the 
high stakes case could therefore potentially explain why participants are equally 
likely to agree with the statement that the protagonist knows in the high stakes 
case as in the low stakes case.
Another factor that might be obscuring an underlying stakes effect in the 
evidence- fixed design is that the quality of the subject’s evidence that P is so 
high in all conditions (from low to high) that stakes aren’t having an observable 
effect on judgments about whether the subject knows that P, because judgments 
that the subject knows will already be at or near ceiling. The data represented in 
Figure 1 is compatible with this possibility, since agreement with “S knows that 
P” is consistently high across scenarios and degrees of stakes, and agreement 
with “S doesn’t know that P” is consistently low across scenarios and degrees of 
stakes. It’s possible that scenarios in which the subject’s evidence is lower qual-
ity might leave room for the stakes effect to show up in participants’ responses.19
A second type of explanation of the divergent patterns of results is not fa-
vorable to the existence of genuine stakes effects on knowledge. One version of 
this type of explanation holds that the failure to detect a stakes effect in most 
evidence- fixed experiments is because there is no stakes effect on knowledge, 
while the finding of an effect in the evidence- seeking experiments arises not from 
a stakes effect on knowledge, but a stakes effect on the deontic modal (“have”) that 
appears in the evidence- seeking prompt (Buckwalter & Schaffer 2015).
18. We did find evidence of a small effect of stakes on knowledge when replicating Sripada 
and Stanley’s (2012) evidence- fixed experiment.
19. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this possibility.
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Our finding of a stakes effect on sceptical “never” responses in our second 
“Symmetrical” experiment, and our finding of a stakes effect on responses to the 
negative polarity prompts provide a novel response to this explanation: since 
neither the prompt to which the “never” responses are directly offered, nor the 
negative polarity prompts, contains a deontic modal, the observed stakes effect 
cannot be explained away as the effect of stakes on a deontic modal.20
Another version of the second type of explanation (which is not favorable 
to the existence of a stakes effect on knowledge) is proposed in Gerken (2017). 
Gerken explains the apparent stakes effect in Pinillos’s evidence- seeking experi-
ments as resulting from what he calls an “Epistemic Actionability- Proxy” heu-
ristic, which leads participants to interpret the prompts in the evidence- seeking 
design as “concerning how much evidence S should gather before it is reasonable to act 
on P, rather than concerning the nature of knowledge” (2017: 271).
While Gerken’s explanation accounts for the stakes effect we found in re-
sponses to positive polarity prompts, it doesn’t easily account for our finding of 
a stakes effect on “never” responses, and on responses to the negative polarity 
prompts (“How many times can S check and not know that P?”). Gerken might 
argue that “never” responses indicate that participants think that the subject in 
the scenario should never perform the relevant action (checking that the steps for 
creating the vaccine have been correctly carried out, e.g.), but that strikes us as 
implausible (see Footnote 17, above). Also problematic for Gerken’s explanation 
is the fact that we found a stakes effect in response to negative polarity prompts, 
which can’t be interpreted as asking how much evidence S should gather before 
it is reasonable to act on P. He could potentially argue that the negative prompts 
are proxies for a question about how much evidence S could gather and yet not 
act on P, but as Nagel (2011) discusses, sentential negation (such as occurs in our 
negative prompts) generally triggers effortful type- 2 processing, which would 
interfere with Gerken’s heuristic- based (type- 1) explanation of responses to the 
evidence- seeking prompts.
Like Gerken, Nagel (2008) provides an explanation of stakes effects in terms 
of a psychological effect that is not (directly) a stakes effect on knowledge, 
namely “need- for- closure”. “Closure” is the arrival at a settled belief; prior to 
closure, one’s mental state is “open” or non- committed (2008: 287). “Low need- 
for- closure” is a state in which a subject is “strongly averse to inaccurate or pre-
mature judgment, as in [high- stakes scenarios]”, while subjects in low- stakes 
scenarios are in a state of “neutral” need- for- closure (2008: 288). Subjects who 
have a lower need- for- closure seek more evidence before settling on a belief, and 
20. Our finding comports with the finding of a stakes effect on knowledge “retractions”— 
which also can’t be explained away as the result of a stakes effect on a deontic modal— described 
in Dinges and Zakkou (2019).
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are characterized by lower degrees of confidence in the belief even once settled. 
Given that subjects in high- stakes scenarios are also in a state of low need- for- 
closure, Nagel argues that stakes effects might be driven by the fact that it is belief 
formation that is directly sensitive to stakes, while knowledge is only sensitive to 
stakes indirectly (assuming belief is a component of knowledge). Nagel’s com-
peting explanation of stakes effects in terms of need- for- closure is not ruled out 
by the stakes effects we found in the evidence- seeking experiments.21
While our experiments do not rule out the possibility that stakes effects could 
be explained in terms of need- for- closure, Pinillos (2012: 202) ran an experiment 
in which participants were explicitly told that the subject in the scenario “forms 
the belief” that P before they are asked to judge how many times the subject has 
to check before she knows that P. Even with this modification to the evidence- 
seeking design, Pinillos still found a significant stakes effect on responses to the 
knowledge prompt, which provides reason to doubt that stakes are affecting 
knowledge indirectly through affecting belief formation.22
As discussed above, Gerken (2017) and Nagel (2008) use mechanisms drawn 
from cognitive psychology to explain apparent stakes effects in a way that is 
consistent with “intellectualist invariantism”, the view that practical factors like 
stakes do not directly affect knowledge. Another approach to making intellec-
tual invariantism compatible with the apparent stakes effects on knowledge is 
to invoke pragmatic linguistic mechanisms, like conversational implicature, to 
explain what participants are responding to when asked to judge whether a sub-
ject knows something.23 To the best of our knowledge, no one has proposed 
a pragmatic explanation of the apparent stakes effect revealed in evidence- 
seeking experiments. But we did consider one possible pragmatic confound 
present in the first version of our evidence- seeking experiment, in the form of 
the presupposition trigger “still” that appeared in the negative prompts in our 
first evidence- seeking experiment (“How many times can S [check] and still not 
know that P?”). But we replicated our findings of a stakes effect and framing ef-
fect (in which there were far greater numbers of “never” responses in response 
to negative prompts than to positive prompts) even when “still” was removed 
from the negative prompts (see §5.5).
21. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
22. Pinillos’s modified experiment does not rule out the possibility that stakes are affecting 
knowledge by affecting confidence, however. See Bach (2005: §V) for defense of that possibility.
23. Brown (2006) and Rysiew (2007) offer such pragmatic explanations of patterns of judg-
ments that might appear to lend support to epistemic contextualism (see Hansen & Chemla 2013; 
and Grindrod, Andow, & Hansen 2018 for experimental evidence that such patterns exist); Dinges 
(2018) and Stoutenberg (2017) are recent challenges to such pragmatic explanations of patterns of 
contextualist judgments.
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6.2. Framing Effects and Skepticism
We uncovered a large framing effect on participants’ willingness to say that a 
subject in a scenario never can know that something is the case. These skepti-
cal responses appeared at a much greater rate when participants responded to 
negative polarity prompts.
6.3. Advantages of Our Methodology
In order to investigate the stakes sensitivity of knowledge, we have incorporated 
a diverse set of scenarios that vary both what is at stake and how much is at stake. 
Previous research has predominately incorporated a single pair of vignettes that 
involve more or less commonplace scenarios. By including a variety of stakes, 
from extreme cases involving dozens of lives at risk in spectacular circumstances, 
to less extreme cases involving degrees of embarrassment, as well as vignettes 
that scale these stakes in magnitude, we can begin to build a finer- grained pic-
ture of the stakes sensitivity of knowledge than is possible from previous stud-
ies. Aside from being statistically more powerful, the variety of scenarios we 
employed also speaks to the generality of the effect— where we have consistently 
found (in the evidence- seeking design) stakes, framing and scalar effects across 
scenarios we can be more confident that such results are not unforeseen artefacts 
of the particular vignettes employed.
Stakes effects were elusive in our original evidence- fixed study, although 
a registered replication of Sripada and Stanley (2012) confirmed that such ef-
fects could be found (though the overall pattern of stakes effects on knowledge 
that we observed in our replication did not match those observed by Sripada 
and Stanley). In both the original Sripada and Stanley study and our replication, 
questions about the quality of the evidence available to the protagonist always 
preceded questioning the participants whether they agreed with a claim about 
knowledge, potentially contributing to the finding of an effect. In contrast, in our 
first experiment, where we did not find evidence of a stakes effect, we did not 
ask participants to assess the quality of evidence available. A direct comparison 
of evidence- quality question- present versus question- absent conditions is need-
ed to clarify whether this difference contributes to determining whether stakes 
effects are observed in an evidence- fixed design.24
The contrast between the mixed results in evidence- fixed designs and the 
more consistent results in evidence- seeking designs serves to reinforce the no-
24. Sripada and Stanley (2012: 7) argue that the quality of evidence question is needed to 
focus participants’ attention on the question of evidence in the knowledge question. Without it, 
they think, participants may be inclined to focus only on the factivity of the knowledge question.
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tion that evidence- seeking designs are likely to be more informative experimen-
tal tools for further research on stakes effects.
Finally, because we included both negative and positive polarity prompts, 
we have been able to determine the role played by the polarity of a prompt is 
affecting judgments about knowledge. Most importantly, if we had not included 
this positive- negative prompt distinction, then we would not have been able to 
detect and interpret the large framing effects observed in our evidence- seeking 
experiments or uncover the stakes effects on “0” and “never” responses that we 
observed.
Though no single experimental investigation of a stakes effect on knowledge 
can definitively settle the existence of such an effect, the results of this study pro-
vide new reasons to think that such an effect exists.
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Appendix I: Experiment 1
1. Individual Scenario Analyses
For each individual scenario 2 x 4 mixed model Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
was performed on levels of agreement, with polarity (know, doesn’t know) as 
the between- subjects factor and stakes scale (one [low], two, three, four [high]) as 
the within- subjects factor. This analysis was replicated with a generalized esti-
mating equation (GEE) using a linear model. Note that, where these were con-
ducted, the non- significant results of multiple comparison follow- up tests in the 
non- parametric analyses are likely due to the weak global stakes effect (η2 = .03).
1.1. Paramedic Scenario
ANOVA found no main effect of stakes (p =.813) and no interaction of polarity 
x stakes (p =.333). There was a main effect of polarity, (F(1, 95) = 149.03, p <.001, 
η2 = .61) with lower levels of agreement for the negative polarity prompts. GEE 
similarly revealed no main effect of stakes (p =.795) and no interaction between 
stakes x polarity (p =.500). There was a main effect of polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 
154.42, p < .001) as above.
1.2. Vaccine Scenario
ANOVA found no main effect of stakes, (p = .075) and no interaction of polarity 
x stakes (p =.817). There was a main effect of polarity, (F(1, 95) = 212.46, p < .001, 
η2 = .69) with lower levels of agreement for the negative polarity prompts. GEE 
revealed a main effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 8.58, p = .035) but no interaction 
between stakes x polarity (p =.863). There was a main effect of polarity, (Wald 
X2[1] = 206.30, p < .001) as above. Follow- up tests (sequential Bonferroni) examin-
ing the main effect of stakes were non- significant (ps >.092).
1.3. Mountaineering Scenario
ANOVA found no main of stakes (p = .650) and no interaction of polarity x stakes 
(p = .776). There was a main effect of polarity (F(1, 95) = 163.29, p < .001, η2 = 63) 
with lower levels of agreement for the negative polarity prompts. GEE revealed 
a no main effect of stakes (p = .617) and no interaction between stakes x polarity 
(p =.789). There was a main effect of polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 147.06, p < .001) as 
above.
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1.4. Game Show Scenario
ANOVA revealed no main of stakes (p = .252) and no interaction of polarity x 
stakes (p = .513). There was a main effect of polarity (F(1, 95) = 72.55, p < .001, 
η2 = .43) with lower levels of agreement for the negative polarity prompts. GEE 
revealed a no main effect of stakes (p = .088) and no interaction between stakes 
x polarity (p =.417). There was a main effect of polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 71.27, p < 
.001) as above.
1.5. Introductions Scenario
ANOVA found no main of stakes (p = .055) and no interaction of polarity x stakes 
(p = .803). There was a main effect of polarity (F(1, 95) = 278.95, p < .001, η2 = 
.75) with lower levels of agreement for the negative polarity prompts. Follow- 
up tests (Bonferroni) examining the stakes effect were non- significant (ps >.091). 
GEE revealed no main effect of stakes (p = .074) and no interaction between stakes 
x polarity (p =.871). There was a main effect of polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 275.46, p < 
.001) as above.
1.6. Possessions Scenario
ANOVA found no main of stakes (p = .983) and no interaction of polarity x stakes 
(p = .954). As expected, there was a main effect of polarity (F(1, 95) = 323.81, p < 
.001, η2 = .77) with lower levels of agreement for the negative polarity prompts. 
GEE revealed no main effect of stakes (p = .995) and no interaction between stakes 
x polarity (p =.931). There was a main effect of polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 308.64, p < 
.001) as above.
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Appendix II: Registered Replication of Sripada and Stanley 
(2012)
1. Open Science Protocol
Adopting the experimental design of Sripada and Stanley (2012), we prereg-
istered the experiment (background, methods, and power analysis) using the 
Open Science Framework repository (osf.io/sqeau). Our preregistration was 
submitted prior to data collection and is accessible to the public.
2. Participants
Four hundred and thirty participants (183 females, 246 males, 1 non- binary gen-
der identity) between 20 and 67 years (M = 35.99 years, SD = 10.55 years) were re-
cruited from MTurk and paid $0.50 for participating. This research received ethi-
cal approval from the Department of Philosophy, University of Reading, UK and 
informed consent was obtained from all participants. As before, screening pro-
cedures were performed ex post to identify suspicious or low- quality responses 
in all datasets. Following screening procedures, 63 VPS and further suspicious 
responses were flagged and removed. As in the original experiment, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of six conditions (N = 58 – 68 per condition).
3. Materials and Procedure
As in the original study (Sripada & Stanley 2012), we investigated three pairs of 
vignettes, each of which had a low and high stakes version. After reading one 
vignette, participants were asked to respond to two questions:
 1. What is the strength of Hannah’s evidence that her noodles are not topped 
with pine nuts?
 2. Suppose it turns out that her noodles are not topped with pine nuts. Please 
rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following sentence:
  “Hannah knows her noodles are not topped with pine nuts.”
Participants responded to the first question (evidence prompt) along a 7- point 
Likert- type scale (1- Very weak evidence, 7- Very strong evidence) and to the second 
prompt (knowledge prompt) along another 7- point Likert- type scale (1- Strongly 
agree, 7- Strongly disagree). Questions were presented in the same order (as above).
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Appendix III: Experiment 2
Overall, 32 “never” responses were given in the positive polarity condition and 
271 “never” responses were given in the negative polarity condition. These re-
sponses were removed from main analyses and analysed separately. Responses 
across both polarity conditions were positively skewed across all stakes condi-
tions and all scenarios. Two analyses were subsequently performed across the 
stakes versions of each scenario. Given the violations of normality and homoge-
neity of variance in the data a Generalised Estimating Equation (GEE) gamma 
(log link) analysis was conducted first with stakes (one [low]; two; three; four 
[high]) as within- subjects factor and polarity (positive; negative) as between- 
subjects factor. A second GEE analysis was subsequently conducted following 
the removal of extreme outliers. Datasets were log- transformed and outlier de-
tection performed on the normalised distributions. Outliers were identified as 
those outside the range of: median +/- 2.5 x Median Absolute Deviation (MAD). 
Analysis was then performed on the non- transformed, skewed data with outli-
ers now removed.
1. Individual Scenario Analyses
Across all scenarios, there was a general pattern of participants stating that more 
evidence would be required by the protagonist in order to know something 
(positive polarity)/still not know something (negative polarity) as the stakes in-
creased and this pattern remained following outlier removal.
1.1. Paramedic Scenario
Initial analysis (N = 337, zero values ignored) revealed no main effect of stakes, 
(p =.082) and no main effect of polarity (p = .092). There was a significant inter-
action of polarity x stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 11.29, p =.010). Follow- up tests using 
sequential Bonferroni revealed a significant difference between the stakes 1 [low] 
scenario and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p =.024) in the positive polarity only.
Having extracted extreme outliers (N = 444 to N = 325, zero values ignored), 
the second analysis revealed a main effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 11.14, p =.011). 
There was no main effect of polarity, (p =.055) and no significant interaction of 
polarity x stakes, (p =.215). Comparisons using sequential Bonferroni indicated 
that there was a significant difference between the stakes 1 [low] scenario and the 
stakes 3 scenario (p =.007). These effects were across polarity.
1.2. Vaccine Scenario
462 • Kathryn Francis, Philip Beaman, and Nat Hansen
Ergo • vol. 6, no. 16 • 2019
Initial GEE analysis (N = 383, zero values ignored) revealed a main effect of 
stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 19.91, p <.001) and a significant interaction of polarity x 
stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 15.17, p =.002). Follow- up tests using sequential Bonfer-
roni found no significant differences between stakes scenarios in either polarity. 
These non- significant follow- up tests are likely due to large variances in the da-
taset. There was no main effect of polarity, (p =.058).
Having extracted extreme outliers (N = 436 to N = 355), the second analysis 
likewise revealed a main effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 9.17, p =.027). There was 
no main effect of polarity, (p =.065) and no interaction of polarity x stakes, (p 
=.676). Comparisons using sequential Bonferroni indicated that there was a sig-
nificant difference between the stakes 1 [low] scenario and the stakes 3 scenario 
(p =.032). These effects were across polarity.
1.3. Mountaineering Scenario
An initial analysis (N = 374, zero values ignored) found no main effect of stakes, 
(p =.190) and no interaction of polarity x stakes, (p = .533). There was a main ef-
fect of polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 4.23, p =.040). The second analysis revealed a main 
effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 18.62, p <.001). There was no main effect of polar-
ity, (p =.090) and no interaction of polarity x stakes, (p =.061). Comparisons using 
sequential Bonferroni indicated that there was a significant difference between 
the stakes 1 [low] scenario and the stakes 2 scenario (p =.011), the stakes 1 [low] 
scenario and the stakes 3 scenario (p =.003), and the stakes 1 [low] scenario and 
the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p <.001). These effects were across polarity.
1.4. Game Show Scenario
Initial analysis (N = 339, zero values ignored) revealed a main effect of stakes, 
(Wald X2[3] = 18.30, p <.001). There was no main effect of polarity, (p =.532) and 
no interaction of polarity x stakes, (p = .061). Comparisons using sequential Bon-
ferroni found no differences between stakes scenarios in either polarity. These 
non- significant follow- up tests are likely due to large variances in the dataset.
Having extracted extreme outliers (N = 436 to N = 297, zero values ignored), 
the second GEE analysis likewise revealed a main effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 
13.48, p =.004). There was no main effect of polarity, (p =.281) and no interaction 
of polarity x stakes, (p =.502). Comparisons using sequential Bonferroni indi-
cated that there was a significant difference between the stakes 1 [low] scenario 
and the stakes 3 scenario (p =.019) and the stakes 1 [low] scenario and the stakes 
4 [high] scenario (p =.007). There was also a significant difference between the 
stakes 2 scenario and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p =.021). These effects were 
across polarity.
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1.5. Introduction Scenario
Initial analysis (N = 376, zero values ignored) revealed a main effect of stakes, 
(Wald X2[3] = 17.02, p =.001) and a main effect of polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 4.06, 
p =.044). There was no interaction of polarity x stakes, (p = .629). Comparisons 
using sequential Bonferroni indicated that there was a significant difference 
between the stakes 1 [low] scenario and the stakes 3 scenario (p =.016) and the 
stakes 1 [low] scenario and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p =.021). These effects 
were across polarity.
Having extracted extreme outliers (N = 436 to N = 364), the second GEE anal-
ysis likewise revealed a main effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 12.59, p =.006). There 
was no main effect of polarity, (p =.171) and no interaction of polarity x stakes, 
(p =.757). Comparisons using sequential Bonferroni indicated that there was a 
significant difference between the stakes 1 [low] scenario and the stakes 4 [high] 
scenario (p =.005). These effects were across polarity.
1.6. Possessions Scenario
Initial GEE analysis (N = 336, zero values ignored) revealed a main effect of 
stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 21.68, p <.001) and a significant interaction of polarity x 
stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 10.19, p =.017). There was no main effect of polarity, (p = 
.541). Comparisons using sequential Bonferroni found no differences between 
stakes scenarios in either polarity. These non- significant follow- up tests are like-
ly due to large variances in the dataset.
Having extracted extreme outliers (N = 436 to N = 322), the second GEE analy-
sis revealed a main effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 17.04, p =.001) and a significant 
interaction of polarity x stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 8.34, p =.040). There was no main 
effect of polarity, (p =.137). Comparisons using sequential Bonferroni indicated 
that there was a significant difference between the stakes 1 [low] scenario and the 
stakes 4 [high] scenario (p <.001), the stakes 2 scenario and the stakes 4 [high] sce-
nario (p <.001), and the stakes 3 scenario and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p =.001) 
in the positive polarity only.
2. Never and Zero Responses
In order to interpret the full range of responses given in the evidence- seeking 
experiments, separate analyses were performed on both “never” and “0” re-
sponses which could be given in response to the following prompts:
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Never responses: If you think S will never know no matter how many 
times she checks, write “never”
Zero responses: If you think S knows without having to check, write “0”
The number of “never” responses given in response to scenarios in the negative 
polarity were significantly higher across all three experiments when compared 





(“Never” count) Chi- Square 
Original Prompts 32 271 χ²(1) = 188.52, p < .001
The number of “0” responses given in response to scenarios in the positive polar-
ity were higher in both the original prompts and symmetrical prompts experi-
ments when compared to the negative polarity conditions (see the table below). 
Note that zero responses are not recorded for the matched prompts follow- up 
experiment as the response option was removed to create the matched design 





(“0” count) Chi- Square
Original Prompts 118 49 χ²(1) = 28.51, p < .001
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Appendix IV: Follow- Up Evidence- Seeking Experiments
1. Symmetrical Experiment
1.1. Materials and Procedure
The same set of scenarios were presented to participants in the same random-
ized block design as in Experiment 2. For this follow- up experiment, the prompts 
were modified to ensure symmetry between the positive and negative polarities. 
For example, in response to the vaccine scenario, participants in the positive po-
larity condition were asked:
What is the minimum numbers of times Elaine needs to consult her check 
list before she knows that she is making the vaccine correctly?
____ times
and participants in the negative polarity were asked:
What is the maximum number of times Elaine can consult her check list 
and not know that she is making the vaccine correctly?
____ times
As in the first evidence- seeking experiment, after reading the positive polarity 
prompt, participants were asked to respond as follows:
enter a whole number: 1, 2, 3 . . . etc. If you think Elaine knows without 
having to check, write “0”. If you think Elaine will never know no matter 
how many times she checks, write “never”
Participants were asked to respond as follows in the negative polarity condition:
enter a whole number: 1, 2, 3 . . . etc. If you think Elaine will never know 
no matter how many times she checks, write “never”
1.2. Participants
One hundred and twenty- one participants were recruited from MTurk and paid 
$1.75 each for participating. This research received ethical approval from the De-
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partment of Philosophy, University of Reading, UK and informed consent was 
obtained from all participants. As before, screening procedures were performed 
ex post to identify suspicious or low- quality responses in all datasets. Following 
screening procedures, one suspicious response was flagged and removed. Addi-
tionally, participants who responded incorrectly to one of two control prompts 
(as in the first evidence- seeking experiment) were removed from further data 
analysis. A total of 12 participants were removed having failed these checks. Ad-
ditionally, three participants were removed having already completed the first 
evidence- seeking experiment, leaving a final sample of 105 participants (45 fe-
males, 59 males) between 21 and 65 years old (M = 37.09 years, SD = 10.67 years). 
Participants were randomly assigned to a positive polarity condition (N = 58) or 
a negative polarity condition (N = 47).
1.3. Missing Values, Normality, and Outliers
Overall, 25 “never” responses were given in the positive polarity condition and 
178 “never” responses were given in the negative polarity condition. These re-
sponses were removed from main analyses and analysed separately. As in the 
first evidence- seeking experiment, data were non- normal with responses in the 
both conditions being positively skewed. Two analyses were subsequently per-
formed across the stakes versions of each scenario; given normality and homo-
geneity of variance violations in the data, a Generalised Estimating Equation 
(GEE) (non- parametric equivalent) with stakes (one [low]; two; three; four [high]) 
as within- subjects factor and polarity (positive; negative) as between- subjects 
factor) was initially conducted and the results of a second GEE analysis follow-
ing the removal of extreme outliers are also reported.
1.4. Summary of Descriptive Statistics (prior to outlier removal and 
following removal)
Across all scenarios, there was a general pattern of participants stating that more 
evidence would be required by the protagonist in order to know something 
(positive polarity)/still not know something (negative polarity) as the stakes 
increased. This pattern of responses remained with extreme outliers removed 
There was a general pattern of participants stating that more evidence would be 
required by the protagonist in order to know something (positive polarity)/still 
not know something (negative polarity) as the stakes increased.
In terms of replicating the stakes effects observed in the first evidence- 
seeking experiment, we found a main effect of stakes in the paramedic and game 
show scenarios (see Figure 9). However, we did not observe a stakes effect in the 
vaccine, mountaineering, introductions, or possessions scenarios. Additionally, 
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across four of the six scenarios, we did not observe significant differences in 
responses to positive and negative polarity prompts. An effect of polarity in the 
paramedic and mountaineering scenarios, in which evidence scores were higher 
for the positive polarity. A full breakdown of analysis by scenario follows this 
summary.
1.5. Individual Scenario Analyses
1.5.1. Paramedic Scenario
Initial analysis (N = 359, zero values ignored) revealed a main effect of stakes, 
(Wald X2[3] = 16.12, p =.001) and a significant interaction of polarity x stakes, 
Figure 9. The amount of evidence participants state is needed in order for the 
protagonist to know/still not know across all stakes versions of all six scenarios. 
These figures show the data after removal of extreme outliers (i.e., the data used 
in the second analyses reported below). Amount of evidence required increased 
as the stakes were raised across polarities in the paramedic and game show 
scenarios (note positive gradient of lines) however in this experiment, there 
was no main effect of stakes in the vaccine, mountaineering, introduction, or 
possessions scenarios. Error bars represent +/- 1 SE.
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(Wald X2[3] = 16.26, p =.001). Follow- up tests using sequential Bonferroni re-
vealed no significant differences between stakes scenarios in either polarity. 
These non- significant follow- up tests are likely due to large variances in the da-
taset. There was no main effect of polarity, (p = .096). Having extracted extreme 
outliers (N = 359 to N = 339, zero values ignored), further analysis confirmed a 
main effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 11.50, p =.009) and a main effect of polarity, 
was also observed (Wald X2[1] = 4.19, p =.041). There was no significant interac-
tion of polarity x stakes, (p =.933). Follow- up tests using sequential Bonferroni 
revealed no significant differences between stakes scenarios in either polarity. 
These non- significant follow- up tests are likely due to a small global effect. Se-
quential Bonferroni comparisons did reveal that evidence scores were signifi-
cantly higher in the positive polarity group when compared to the negative po-
larity group, (p =.043).
1.5.2. Vaccine Scenario
Initial GEE analysis (N = 365, zero values ignored) revealed a main effect of 
stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 9.65, p =.022), and main effect of polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 
14.64, p <.001) and a significant interaction of polarity x stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 
19.46, p <.001). Follow- up tests using sequential Bonferroni revealed no signifi-
cant differences between stakes scenarios in either polarity. These non- significant 
follow- up tests are likely due to large variances in the dataset. Having extracted 
extreme outliers (N = 365 to N = 325), further analysis found no main effect of 
stakes, (p =.087), no main effect of polarity, (p =.100) and no significant interac-
tion of polarity x stakes, (p =.063).
1.5.3. Mountaineering Scenario
Initial analysis (N = 389, zero values ignored) revealed a main effect of stakes, 
(Wald X2[3] = 32.62, p <.001) and a main effect of polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 4.05, p 
=.044). There was no interaction of polarity x stakes, (p = .083). There was a main 
effect of polarity. Comparisons using sequential Bonferroni found no significant 
differences between the polarities. In terms of differences between the stakes 
scenarios, sequential Bonferroni comparisons found no significant differences 
between stakes scenarios. These non- significant follow- up tests are likely due to 
large variances in the dataset. Having extracted extreme outliers (N = 389 to N = 
362, zero values ignored), another GEE analysis found no main effect of stakes, 
(p =.112) and no interaction of polarity x stakes, (p =.514). There was a main effect 
of polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 7.61, p =.006) with evidence scores higher in the posi-
tive polarity group when compared to the negative polarity, (p =.005).
1.5.4. Game Show Scenario
Initial analysis (N = 337, zero values ignored) found no main effect of stakes, (p 
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=.377), no main effect of polarity, (p =.625) and no interaction of polarity x stakes, 
(p = .057).
Having extracted extreme outliers (N = 337 to N = 313, zero values ignored), 
further GEE analysis revealed a main effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 10.24, p =.017). 
There was no main effect of polarity, (p =.556) and no interaction of polarity x 
stakes, (p =.757). Comparisons using sequential Bonferroni indicated that there 
was a significant difference between the stakes 1 [low] scenario and the stakes 3 
scenario (p =.013) and the stakes 1 [low] scenario and the stakes 4 [high] scenario 
(p =.016). These effects were across polarity.
1.5.5. Introduction Scenario
An initial GEE analysis (N = 375, zero values ignored) revealed a significant in-
teraction of polarity x stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 9.28, p =.026). There was no main ef-
fect of polarity, (p =.130) and no main effect of stakes, (p = .093). Comparisons us-
ing sequential Bonferroni comparisons found no significant differences between 
stakes scenarios. After extracting extreme outliers (N = 375 to N = 355), another 
GEE analysis found no main effect of stakes, (p =.961), no main effect of polarity, 
(p =.168) and no interaction of polarity x stakes, (p =.756).
1.5.6. Possessions Scenario
An initial GEE analysis was performed using a poisson25 (log link) model (N = 
381). Analysis revealed a main effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 92.12, p <.001) and 
a significant interaction of polarity x stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 47.71, p <.001). There 
was no main effect of polarity, (p = .061). Comparisons using sequential Bonfer-
roni found no differences between stakes scenarios in either polarity. These non- 
significant follow- up tests are likely due to large variances in the dataset. Having 
extracted extreme outliers (N = 336, zero values excluded), another GEE analysis 
with gamma (log link) model was performed on the evidence scores. Analysis 
revealed no main effect of stakes, (p =.119) and no interaction of polarity x stakes, 
(p =.989). There was a main effect of polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 4.47, p =.034) with 
higher levels of evidence given in response to positive polarity prompts.26
25. Gamma distribution was not used in this instance as the data violated assumptions for 
analysis (errors in computing the inverse log- link function).
26. Results replicated using Poisson distribution (log function).
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2. Matched Experiment
2.1. Materials and Procedure
The same set of scenarios were presented to participants in the same random-
ized block design as in Experiment 2. For this follow- up experiment, the same 
set of symmetrical prompts were used in both the positive and negative polarity 
groups. However, the additional option to write “0” following the positive po-
larity prompts, was removed:
Original
enter a whole number: 1, 2, 3 . . . etc. If you think Elaine knows without 
having to check, write “0”. If you think Elaine will never know no matter 
how many times she checks, write “never”
Modified
enter a whole number: 1, 2, 3 . . . etc. If you think Elaine will never know 
no matter how many times she checks, write “never”
2.2. Participants
One hundred and twenty participants were recruited from MTurk and paid 
$1.75 each for participating. This research received ethical approval from the De-
partment of Philosophy, University of Reading, UK and informed consent was 
obtained from all participants. As before, screening procedures were performed 
ex post to identify suspicious or low- quality responses in all datasets. Following 
screening procedures, seven suspicious responses were flagged and removed. 
Additionally, participants who responded incorrectly to one of two control 
prompts were removed from further data analysis. A total of nine participants 
were removed having failed these checks. Additionally, 15 participants were re-
moved having already completed the first evidence- seeking experiment, leaving 
a final sample of 89 participants (33 females, 56 males) between 20 and 70 years 
old (M = 34.71 years, SD = 10.84 years). Participants were randomly assigned to 
a positive polarity condition (N = 45) or a negative polarity condition (N = 44).
2.3. Missing Values, Normality, and Outliers
Overall, 29 “never” responses were given in the positive polarity condition and 
185 “never” responses were given in the negative polarity condition. These re-
sponses were removed from main analyses and analysed separately.
As in the first evidence- seeking experiment, data were non- normal with re-
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sponses in the both conditions being positively skewed. Two analyses were sub-
sequently performed across the stakes versions of each scenario; given normality 
and homogeneity of variance violations in the data, a Generalised Estimating 
Equation (GEE) (non- parametric) and a second GEE analysis following the re-
moval of extreme outliers.
2.4. Summary of Descriptive Statistics (prior to outlier removal and 
following removal)
Across all scenarios, there was a general pattern of participants stating that more 
evidence would be required by the protagonist in order to know something 
(positive polarity)/still not know something (negative polarity) as the stakes 
increased. This pattern of responses remained with extreme outliers removed. 
There was a general pattern of participants stating that more evidence would be 
required by the protagonist in order to know something (positive polarity)/still 
not know something (negative polarity) as the stakes increased.
In terms of replicating the stakes effects observed in the first evidence- seeking 
experiment, we found a main effect of stakes across all scenarios excluding the in-
troduction scenario (see Figure 10). As in the first evidence- seeking experiment, the 
main effect of stakes in the possessions scenario was observed in the positive polar-
ity only and unique to this experiment, so was the main effect of stakes in the game 
show scenario. Across four of the six scenarios, we did not observe significant dif-
ferences in responses to positive and negative polarity prompts. However, in this 
experiment, we did observe an effect of polarity in the vaccine and possessions sce-
narios; evidence scores were higher for the positive polarity in the vaccine case but 
lower for the positive polarity in the possessions case. A full breakdown of analy-
sis by scenario follows this summary. As previously, an initial GEE analysis was 
performed using a gamma (log link) model with stakes (one [low]; two; three; four 
[high]) as within- subjects factor and polarity (positive; negative) as between- subjects 
factor and then repeated once extreme outliers had been identified and removed.
2.5. Individual Scenario Analyses
2.5.1. Paramedic Scenario
Initial GEE analysis (N = 316, zero values ignored) revealed a main effect of 
stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 11.25, p =.010) and a significant interaction of polarity x 
stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 16.10, p =.001). There was no main effect of polarity, (p 
=.312). Follow- up tests using sequential Bonferroni a significant difference be-
tween evidence scores between the stakes 1 [low] paramedic scenario and the 
stakes 2 scenarios (p =.034), the stakes 3 scenario (p <.001), and the stakes 4 [high] 
scenario (p <.001). There was also a significant difference in levels of evidence 
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between the stakes 2 scenario and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p =.012). These ef-
fects were present for the positive polarity only.
Having extracted extreme outliers (N = 316 to N = 285, zero values ignored), 
another GEE analysis confirmed a main effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 27.70, p 
<.001). There was no significant interaction of polarity x stakes, (p =.076) and no 
main effect of polarity, (p =.269). Follow- up tests using sequential Bonferroni 
revealed a significant difference in evidence scores between the stakes 1 [low] 
paramedic scenario and the stakes two (p <.001) and stakes 4 [high] scenario (p 
=.001). There was also a significant difference between the stakes 2 scenario and 
stakes 3 scenario (p =.005).
Figure 10. The amount of evidence participants state is needed in order for the 
protagonist to know/still not know across all stakes versions of all six scenarios. 
Amount of evidence required increased as the stakes were raised across all 
scenarios (note positive gradient of lines) except the introduction scenario. In 
both the possessions and game show scenario, the main effect was observed in 
the positive polarity only. Error bars represent +/- 1 SE.
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2.5.2. Vaccine Scenario
Initial GEE analysis (N = 318, zero values ignored revealed a main effect of stakes, 
(Wald X2[3] = 21.54, p <.001). There was no main effect of polarity, (p =.604) and no 
interaction of polarity x stakes, (p =.137). Follow- up tests using sequential Bonfer-
roni revealed significant differences in evidence scores between the stakes 1 [low] 
vaccine scenario and the stakes 2 scenario (p =.020), the stakes 3 scenario (p =.031), 
and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p =.033). These effects were across polarity.
Having extracted extreme outliers (N = 318 to N = 294), another GEE analysis 
confirmed a main effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 28.19, p <.001) and a main ef-
fect of polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 5.33, p =.021) with higher evidence scores in the 
positive polarity. There was no interaction of polarity x stakes, (p =.624). Follow- 
up tests using sequential Bonferroni revealed significant differences in evidence 
scores between the stakes 1 [low] vaccine scenario and the stakes 2 scenario (p 
=.002), the stakes 3 scenario (p <.001), and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p <.001). 
These effects were across polarity.
2.5.3. Mountaineering Scenario
An initial GEE analysis revealed a main effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 23.91, p 
<.001). There was no main effect of polarity, (p =.625) and no interaction of po-
larity x stakes, (p = .159). Follow- up tests using sequential Bonferroni revealed 
significant differences in evidence scores between the stakes 1 [low] mountain-
eering scenario and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p <.001), between the stakes 
2 scenario and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p <.001), and between the stakes 3 
scenario and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p =.002). These effects were present 
across polarity.
Having extracted extreme outliers (N = 305 to N = 284, zero values ignored), 
another GEE analysis confirmed a main effect of stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 16.88, p 
=.001). There was no main effect of polarity, (p =.395) and no interaction of po-
larity x stakes, (p = .225). Follow- up tests using sequential Bonferroni revealed 
significant differences in evidence scores between the stakes 1 [low] mountain-
eering scenario and the stakes 3 scenario (p =.013) and the stakes 4 [high] scenario 
(p <.001). There was also a significant difference between the stakes 2 scenario 
and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p =.025).
2.5.4. Game Show Scenario
Initial analysis (N = 330, zero values ignored) revealed a main effect of stakes, 
(Wald X2[3] = 38.37, p <.001) and a significant interaction of polarity x stakes, 
(Wald X2[3] = 9.97, p =.019). There was no main effect of polarity, (p =.084). Follow- 
up tests using sequential Bonferroni revealed significant differences in evidence 
scores between the stakes 1 [low] game show scenario and the stakes 3 scenario 
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(p =.002) and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p <.001). There was also a significant 
difference between the stakes 2 scenario and the stakes 3 scenario (p =.001) and 
stakes 4 [high] scenario (p <.001). There was also a significant difference between 
the stakes 3 scenario and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p =.001). These effects were 
present in the positive polarity only.
Having extracted extreme outliers (N = 330 to N = 275, zero values ignored), 
further analysis with gamma (log link) confirmed a main effect of stakes, (Wald 
X2[3] = 13.58, p =.004) and a significant interaction of polarity x stakes, (Wald 
X2[3] = 8.58, p =.035). There was no main effect of polarity (p =.205). Follow- up 
tests using sequential Bonferroni revealed significant differences in evidence 
scores between the stakes 1 [low] game show scenario and the stakes 3 scenario 
(p =.025) and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p =.001). There was also a significant 
difference between the stakes 2 scenario and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p =.049). 
These effects were present in the positive polarity only.
2.5.5. Introduction Scenario
Initial analysis (N = 331, zero values ignored) revealed a main effect of stakes, 
(Wald X2[3] = 9.23, p =.026). There was no main effect of polarity, (p =.295) and 
no interaction of polarity x stakes, (p = .326). Follow- up tests using sequential 
Bonferroni revealed significant differences in evidence scores between the stakes 
1 [low] introduction scenario and the stakes 4 [high] scenario (p =.041). This effect 
was present across polarity
Having extracted extreme outliers (N = 331 to N = 312), further analysis found 
no main effect of stakes, (p =.155), no main effect of polarity, (p =.709) and no in-
teraction of polarity x stakes, (p =.266).
2.5.6. Possessions Scenario
Initial GEE analysis (N = 297, zero values ignored) revealed a main effect of 
stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 9.03, p =.029) and a main effect of polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 
4.14, p =.042) with higher levels of evidence in the negative polarity. There was 
no interaction of polarity x stakes, (p = .248). Comparisons using sequential Bon-
ferroni found no differences between stakes scenarios in either polarity. These 
non- significant follow- up tests are likely due to large variances in the dataset.
Having extracted extreme outliers (N = 297 to 285), further analysis found 
no main effect of stakes, (p =.876) and no main effect of polarity, (p =.099). There 
was a significant interaction of polarity x stakes, (Wald X2[3] = 14.57, p =.002). 
Follow- up tests using sequential Bonferroni revealed significant differences in 
evidence scores between the stakes 1 [low] possessions scenario and the stakes 
4 [high] scenario (p =.039). This effect was present for the positive polarity only.
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3. Never and Zero Responses
In order to interpret the full range of responses given in the evidence- seeking 
experiments, separate analyses were performed on both “never” and “0” re-
sponses which could be given in response to the following prompts:
Never responses: If you think S will never know no matter how many times she 
checks, write “never” (in the positive polarity condition and in the negative 
polarity condition)
Zero responses: If you think S knows without having to check, write “0” (in 
the positive polarity condition)
The number of “never” responses given in response to scenarios in the nega-
tive polarity were significantly higher across all three experiments when com-





(“Never” count) Chi- Square 
Symmetrical 
Prompts
25 178 χ²(1) = 115.32, p < .001
Matched Prompts 29 185 χ²(1) = 113.72, p < .001
The number of “0” responses given in response to scenarios in the positive 
polarity were higher in both the original prompts and symmetrical prompts ex-
periments when compared to the negative polarity conditions (see Table below). 
Again, as in the first evidence- seeking experiment, this isn’t surprising given that 
participants weren’t explicitly given the option to respond with “0” if the subject 
knows without having to check in the negative polarity prompts. The meaning of a 
“0” response when given in response to a positive vs. a negative polarity prompt 
is therefore probably different. Note that zero responses are not recorded for the 
matched prompts follow- up experiment as the response option was removed to cre-





(“0” count) Chi- Square
Symmetrical 
Prompts
84 48 χ²(1) = 9.82, p = .002
In order to investigate stakes effects on these responses, a GEE analysis with 
poisson (loglinear) model was performed on the frequency of “never” responses 
in the follow- up experiment using symmetrical prompts. Analysis revealed a 
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main effect of polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 20.82, p <.001), a main effect of stakes, (Wald 
X2[3] = 14.65, p =.002), and a significant interaction of polarity x stakes, (Wald 
X2[3] = 7.88, p =.049).
When interpreting the interaction, comparisons using sequential Bonferroni 
did not find any significant differences. Given the findings of these follow- up 
tests, we are unable to interpret this interaction. When interpreting the main ef-
fect of stakes, comparisons using sequential Bonferroni indicated a significant 
difference in the frequency of “never” responses between the stakes 1 [low] sce-
narios and the stakes 3 scenarios (p =.016). This effect was present across polari-
ties (see Figure 11).
In order to investigate stakes effects on zero responses in the Symmetrical 
Experiment, a GEE analysis with poisson (loglinear) model was also performed 
on the frequency of zero responses. Analysis revealed a main effect of stakes, 
(Wald X2[3] = 8.73, p =.033). There was no main effect of polarity, (p =.599) and no 
interaction of polarity x stakes, (p =.330).
When interpreting the main effect of stakes, comparisons using sequential 
Bonferroni indicated a significant difference between the zero counts in the 
stakes 1 [low] scenarios and the stakes 3 scenarios (p =.045). The difference be-
tween the stakes 2 scenarios and the stakes 3 scenarios fell short of significance 
(p =.050). This effect was present across polarities (see Figure 12).
Figure 11. The percentage of “never” responses given in each stakes scale (across 
all scenarios) in each polarity condition of the Symmetrical Experiment. The 
frequency of “never” answers given in response to prompts increased as the 
stakes were raised from low stakes to stakes 3. Note: this figure is Figure 7 in the 
manuscript.
Figure 12. The percentage of zero responses given in each stakes scale (across 
all scenarios) in each polarity condition of the Symmetrical Experiment. The 
frequency of zero answers given in response to prompts decreased as the stakes 
were raised from low stakes to stakes 3.
Figure 13. The percentage of “never” responses given in each stakes scale (across 
all scenarios) in each polarity condition of the Symmetrical Experiment. Here 
we find no main effect of stakes on “never” responses to the negative prompts.
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In the Matched Experiment, A GEE analysis with poisson (loglinear) model 
was performed on the frequency of “never” responses, revealing a main effect of 
polarity, (Wald X2[1] = 18.66, p <.001), but no main effect of stakes, (p =.477), and 





Megan, a paramedic, has just been called to an accident involving a collision be-
tween two cars. Megan is driving an ambulance carrying her team of paramedics 
to the scene of the accident. Megan is familiar with the surrounding area, she has 
GPS on her phone that she can check if necessary, and she is traveling on the right 
route to get to the accident. Over the radio, Megan is told that there is one person 
at the scene of the accident with a broken arm, which is not life- threatening. If 
Megan makes a wrong turn on the way to the accident, the injured person will 
be inconvenienced, but nothing terrible will happen.
TWO
Heather, a paramedic, has just been called to an accident involving a collision be-
tween two cars. Heather is driving an ambulance carrying her team of paramed-
ics to the scene of the accident. Heather is familiar with the surrounding area, 
she has GPS on her phone that she can check if necessary, and she is traveling on 
the right route to get to the accident. Over the radio, Heather is told that there is 
one person at the scene of the accident who is bleeding badly. If Heather makes a 
wrong turn on the way to the accident, she will be too late and the injured person 
will bleed to death. 
THREE
Carolyn, a paramedic, has just been called to an accident involving a collision 
between a bus and a truck. Carolyn is driving an ambulance carrying her team of 
paramedics to the scene of the accident. Carolyn is familiar with the surrounding 
area, she has GPS on her phone that she can check if necessary, and she is travel-
27. Note that no GEE analysis was performed for zero responses in this experiment as the 
response option was removed to create the matched design (i.e., If you think S knows without having 
to check, write “0”).
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ing on the right route to get to the accident. Over the radio, Carolyn is told that 
the bus flipped over and there are 15 critically injured people pinned underneath 
the bus. If Carolyn makes a wrong turn on the way to the accident, she will be 
too late and the injured people will die. 
FOUR (HIGH)
Ottoline, a paramedic, has just been called to an accident involving a collision 
between several vehicles, including buses and trucks. Ottoline is driving an am-
bulance carrying her team of paramedics to the scene of the accident. Ottoline is 
familiar with the surrounding area, she has GPS on her phone that she can check 
if necessary, and she is traveling on the right route to get to the accident. Over 
the radio, Ottoline is told that one of the trucks was carrying flammable fuel and 
several vehicles, including a school bus carrying 50 children, are on fire. If Ot-
toline makes a wrong turn on the way to the accident, she will be too late and the 
children will die.
Prompts:
+ How many times does S need to check her GPS before she knows that she will 
make it to the accident without taking a wrong turn?
- How many times can S check her GPS and still not know that she will make it 
to the accident without taking a wrong turn?
Vaccine: lives
ONE (LOW)
Elaine is a medical researcher. Her task is to create a vaccine for a virus. Elaine 
has done this before, and she has a check list that specifies all of the steps she 
needs to take to make the vaccine. Elaine is following all of the steps correctly. 
Elaine’s assistant has informed her that there is one human research participant 
who has volunteered to trial the vaccine before it is distributed more widely. If 
Elaine does not follow the steps correctly, it will produce an ineffective combi-
nation that when administered to the research participant will give them mild 
cold- like symptoms. 
TWO
Alison is a medical researcher. Her task is to create a vaccine for a virus. Ali-
son has done this before, and she has a check list that specifies all of the steps 
she needs to take to make the vaccine. Alison is following all of the steps cor-
rectly. Alison’s assistant has informed her that there is one human research par-
ticipant who has volunteered to trial the vaccine before it is distributed more 
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widely. If Alison does not follow the steps correctly, it will produce a deadly 
combination that when administered to the research participant will kill him 
within days.
THREE
Georgina is a medical researcher. Her task is to create a vaccine for a virus. Geor-
gina has done this before, and she has a check list that specifies all of the steps 
she needs to take to make the vaccine. Georgina is following all of the steps cor-
rectly. Georgina’s assistant has informed her that there are 15 human research 
participants who have volunteered to trial the vaccine before it is distributed 
more widely. If Georgina does not follow the steps correctly, it will produce a 
deadly combination that when administered to the 15 research participants will 
kill them all within days.
FOUR (HIGH)
Julie is a medical researcher. Her task is to create a vaccine for a virus. Julie has 
done this before, and she has a check list that specifies all of the steps she needs 
to take to make the vaccine. Julie is following all of the steps correctly. Julie’s 
assistant has informed her that there are 100 human research participants who 
have volunteered to trial the vaccine before it is distributed more widely. If Julie 
does not follow the steps correctly, it will produce a deadly combination that 
when administered to the 100 research participants, will kill them all after sev-
eral days of excruciating pain. 
Prompts:
+ How many times does S need to consult her check list before she knows that 
she is making the vaccine correctly?
- How many times can S consult her check list and still not know that she is mak-
ing the vaccine correctly?
Mountaineering: personal injury
ONE (LOW)
Josephine is leading a mountain climbing expedition in the Alps with a novice 
climber. Josephine has tied a rope securely to the other climber, in order to pro-
tect him from falls as they move up the mountain together. Visibility is reducing, 
making the climb increasingly dangerous, because it is becoming harder to see 
the edge of the mountain trail that they are following. The drop on either side of 
the trail edge is around 5 feet. If not tied together securely, a slip from this height 
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would result in minor injuries (a minor fracture, for example) to the climber who 
slips, but if the rope is tied securely, no one will be injured from a slip.
TWO
Kristin is leading a mountain climbing expedition in the Alps with a novice 
climber. Kristin has tied a rope securely to the other climber, in order to protect 
him from falls as they move up the mountain together. Visibility is reducing, 
making the climb increasingly dangerous, because it is becoming harder to see 
the edge of the mountain trail that they are following. The drop on either side 
of the trail edge is around 15 feet. If not tied together securely, a slip from this 
height would result in moderate injuries (a broken arm or leg and a concussion) 
to the climber who slips, but if the rope is tied securely, no one will be injured 
from a slip. 
THREE
Teresa is leading a mountain climbing expedition in the Alps with a novice 
climber. Teresa has tied a rope securely to the other climber, in order to protect 
him from falls as they move up the mountain together. Visibility is reducing, 
making the climb increasingly dangerous, because it is becoming harder to see 
the edge of the mountain trail that they are following. The drop on either side 
of the trail edge is around 50 feet. If not tied together securely, a slip from this 
height would result in major injuries (a broken spine or a broken neck) to the 
climber who slips, but if the rope is tied securely, no one will be injured from a 
slip. 
FOUR (HIGH)
Laura is leading a mountain climbing expedition in the Alps with a novice climb-
er. Laura has tied a rope securely to the other climber, in order to protect him 
from falls as they move up the mountain together. Visibility is reducing, making 
the climb increasingly dangerous, because it is becoming harder to see the edge 
of the mountain trail that they are following. The drop on either side of the trail 
edge is around 1,000 feet. A fall from this height would be fatal to the climber 
who slips, but if the rope is tied securely, no one will be injured from a slip.
Prompts:
+ How many times does S need to inspect the rope before she knows that it is 
tied securely?
- How many times can S inspect the rope and still not know that it is tied se-
curely?
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Game show: finance
ONE (LOW)
Emma is taking part in a game show that involves answering general knowledge 
trivia questions. The game show host has asked Emma, “What is the capital of 
Tanzania?”. Emma has recently read a list of the most obscure world capitals 
and the city “Dodoma” pops into her head. In fact, Emma is right: the capital 
of Tanzania is Dodoma. As this is the first round of the game show, only $1 is 
at stake: answering this question correctly will result in Emma winning $1, and 
answering incorrectly will result in her losing $1. 
TWO
Debra is taking part in a game show that involves answering general knowledge 
trivia questions. The game show host has asked Debra, “What is the capital of 
Tanzania?”. Debra has recently read a list of the most obscure world capitals 
and the city “Dodoma” pops into her head. In fact, Debra is right: the capital of 
Tanzania is Dodoma. As this is the second round of the game show, $100 is at 
stake: answering this question correctly will result in Debra winning $100, and 
answering incorrectly will result in her losing $100.
THREE
Lisa is taking part in a game show that involves answering general knowledge 
trivia questions. The game show host has asked Lisa, “What is the capital of Tan-
zania?”. Lisa has recently read a list of the most obscure world capitals and the 
city “Dodoma” pops into her head. In fact, Lisa is right: the capital of Tanzania is 
Dodoma. As this is the third round of the game show, $10,000 is at stake: answer-
ing this question correctly will result in Lisa winning $10,000 and answering 
incorrectly will result in her losing $10,000.
FOUR (HIGH)
Tracy is taking part in a game show that involves answering general knowledge 
trivia questions. The game show host has asked Tracy, “What is the capital of 
Tanzania?”. Tracy has recently read a list of the most obscure world capitals 
and the city “Dodoma” pops into her head. In fact, Tracy is right: the capital of 
Tanzania is Dodoma. As this is the final round of the game show, $1,000,000 is at 
stake: answering this question correctly will result in Tracy winning $1,000,000 
and answering incorrectly will result in her losing $1,000,000.
Prompts:
+ How many minutes does S need to spend considering her answer before she 
knows that the capital of Tanzania is Dodoma?
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- How many minutes can S spend considering her answer and still not know that 
the capital of Tanzania is Dodoma?
Introduction: reputation
ONE (LOW)
Siena teaches at a university and has been asked to introduce a guest speaker to 
her colleagues over lunch. There are 5 colleagues present at lunch. Siena wrote 
down the speaker’s name— “Dr. Woodbridge”— in her notebook earlier in the 
day. But if Siena introduces the guest speaker by the wrong name, she will feel 
slightly embarrassed in front of her colleagues.
TWO
Jane teaches at a university and has been asked to introduce a guest speaker to 
her colleagues during a seminar. There are 20 colleagues present at the seminar. 
Jane wrote down the speaker’s name— “Dr. Woodbridge”— in her notebook ear-
lier in the day. If Jane introduces the guest speaker by the wrong name, she will 
feel embarrassed in front of her colleagues and it will reflect badly on her profes-
sional capabilities.
THREE
Agnes teaches at a university and has been asked to introduce a guest speaker to 
her colleagues and members of the public during a public lecture. There are 200 
people present at the public lecture. Agnes wrote down the speaker’s name— 
“Dr. Woodbridge”— in her notebook earlier in the day. If Agnes introduces the 
guest speaker by the wrong name, she will feel very embarrassed in front of the 
audience and it will reflect very badly on her professional capabilities.
FOUR (HIGH)
Nicole teaches at a university and has been asked to introduce a guest speaker 
on national television as part of a live interview. The interview will be viewed 
live by thousands of people. Nicole wrote down the speaker’s name— “Dr. 
Woodbridge”— in her notebook earlier in the day. If Nicole introduces the guest 
speaker by the wrong name, she will feel very embarrassed in front of a live tele-
vision audience and it will reflect very badly on her professional capabilities and 
on her university’s reputation.
Prompts:
+ How many minutes does S need to check her notebook before she knows that 
the guest speakers name is “Dr. Woodbridge”?
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- How many minutes can S check her notebook and still not know that the guest 
speakers name is “Dr. Woodbridge”?
Arson: personal value
ONE (LOW)
Natalie is living in an area where there have been a series of fires set by arsonists 
recently. Only a functioning sprinkler system can stop a fire set by an arson-
ist. A week ago, Natalie checked that the sprinklers were working in her storage 
room, which contains her garbage and recycling. If the sprinklers do not work, 
everything in the room is at risk from arson. But the sprinklers in the room are 
fully functioning. 
TWO
Winnie is living in an area where there have been a series of fires set by arsonists 
recently. Only a functioning sprinkler system can stop a fire set by an arsonist. A 
week ago, Winnie checked that the sprinklers were working in her living room, 
which contains Winnie’s laptop and hard drive containing all her family photos. 
If the sprinklers do not work, everything in the room, including her laptop and 
hard drive, is at risk from arson. But the sprinklers in the room are fully func-
tioning. 
THREE
Becky is living in an area where there have been a series of fires set by arsonists 
recently. Only a functioning sprinkler system can stop a fire set by an arson-
ist. A week ago, Becky checked that the sprinklers were working in her spare 
bedroom, where the family dog sleeps. If the sprinklers do not work, everything 
in the room, including the family dog, is at risk from arson. But the sprinklers in 
the room are fully functioning.
FOUR (HIGH)
Kylie is living in an area where there have been a series of fires set by arsonists 
recently. Only a functioning sprinkler system can stop a fire set by an arsonist. A 
week ago, Kylie checked that the sprinklers were working in her nursery room, 
where her baby sleeps. If the sprinklers do not work, everything in the room, 
including her baby, is at risk from arson. But the sprinklers in the room are fully 
functioning.
Prompts:
+ How many times does S need to check the sprinklers before she knows that 
they are working in the X room?
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- How many times can S check the sprinklers and still not know that they are 
working in the X room?
Prompt variations
Symmetrical prompts (for evidence- seeking):
In a second experiment, we use these symmetrical prompts (to remove any pre-
suppositions that might be triggered by “and still not know” in the negative 
prompts in the first experiment).
Paramedic
+ What is the minimum number of times S needs to check her GPS before she 
knows that she will make it to the accident without taking a wrong turn?
- What is the maximum number of times S can check her GPS and not know that 
she will make it to the accident without taking a wrong turn?
Vaccine
+ What is the minimum number of times S needs to consult her check list before 
she knows that she is making the vaccine correctly?
- What is the maximum number of times S can consult her check list and not 
know that she is making the vaccine correctly?
Mountaineering
+ What is the minimum number of times S needs to inspect the rope before she 
knows that it is tied securely?
- What is the maximum number of times S can inspect the rope and not know 
that it is tied securely?
Game show
+ What is the minimum number of minutes S needs to spend considering her 
answer before she knows that the capital of Tanzania is Dodoma?
- What is the maximum number of minutes S can spend considering her answer 
and not know that the capital of Tanzania is Dodoma?
Introduction
+ What is the minimum number of times S needs to check the sprinklers before 
she knows that they are working in the X room?
- What is the maximum number of times S can check the sprinklers and not 
know that they are working in the X room?
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Arson
+ What is the minimum number of times S needs to check the sprinklers before 
she knows that they are working in the X room?
- What is the maximum number of times S can check the sprinklers and not 
know that they are working in the X room?
Note: in all evidence- seeking experiments we include the additional instructions 
– if you think S knows without having to check, write “0”. If you think S can never 
know no matter how many times she checks, write “never”.
Prompts (for evidence- fixed experiments):
For experiment one, we used the traditional approach of asking participants the 
extent to which they agree or disagree with knowledge claims:
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following claim:
Paramedic
+Subject x [specific to scenario] knows that she will make it to the accident with-
out taking a wrong turn.
- Subject x [specific to scenario] doesn’t know that she will make it to the accident 
without taking a wrong turn.
Vaccine
+Subject x [specific to scenario] knows that she is making the vaccine correctly.
- Subject x [specific to scenario] doesn’t know that she is making the vaccine cor-
rectly.
Mountaineering
+Subject x [specific to scenario] knows that the rope is tied securely.
- Subject x [specific to scenario] doesn’t know that the rope is tied securely.
Game show
+Subject x [specific to scenario] knows that the capital of Tanzania is Dodoma.
- Subject x [specific to scenario] doesn’t know that the capital of Tanzania is 
Dodoma.
Introduction
+Subject x [specific to scenario] knows that the guest speaker’s name is “Dr 
Woodbridge”.
- Subject x [specific to scenario] doesn’t know that the guest speaker’s name is 
“Dr Woodbridge”.
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Arson
+Subject x [specific to scenario] knows that the sprinklers are working in the x 
room [specific to scenario].
- Subject x [specific to scenario] doesn’t know that the sprinklers are working in 
the x room [specific to scenario].
